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Abstract
You have just decided to sit down and read this abstract; perhaps, at the end of it, you’ll decide
to continue and read this whole thesis. Your ability to freely make that choice is simple enough,
right? Or is the feeling of free willed choice an illusion? Metaphysicians, moral philosophers,
psychologists, and neuroscientists are among the many who have weighed in on this question,
offering a complicated variety of answers. Little work has been done to synthesize these
approaches. My thesis is an attempt at a synthesis, showing that these perspectives can be
reconciled by incorporating ideas from practical reasoning and recent neuroscience. Here, I
review prominent philosophical and scientific work on free will, and offer my own proposal.
My model of free will suggests that neurological activity can orchestrate indeterministic and
deterministic events such that our conscious thought can generate and select novel criteria for
neural activity. This resculpts neural pathways, influencing the channels through which future
decision-making flows. I argue that this is tantamount to having a capacity for self-generating
motivations, which allows both free and conscious choice in the moment, as well as free and
unconscious choice in the future. Because the sculpting of neural activity and networks forces
some unconscious activity to flow through channels of decision-making that we have already
consciously endorsed, I argue that we are responsible for some of our unconscious decisions
as well as conscious ones. Future empirical work can determine the extent to which conscious
control can affect change in the brain, and to what extent unconscious activity conforms to neural
sculpting. This, in turn, will give us greater insight into consequences tied up in our freedom of
will: our moral responsibility, legal responsibility, and personal identity.
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Introduction to Free Will

Science investigates how things work. Discoveries in the biological sciences provide
biological explanations for natural phenomena, such as ecological interactions, cellular activity,
or animal behavior. When neuroscience or cognitive psychology provide a biological explanation
for the occurrence of a human behavior, it seems to subtract from the strength of our seemingly
inexplicable free will to choose our own behavior. Much like how the actual role of gods
in bringing about phenomena in the world are pushed further and further back by scientific
explanations, the role of conscious free will, without a biological explanation of its own, is
similarly reduced as a somehow supernatural force with smaller and smaller domain. Millennia
ago, before we understood that the sun rises and sets because of rotations of the earth on its orbit
around this ball of fiery matter, we attributed the movement of this celestial body to the flaming
chariot of Apollo as he crossed the firmament. When relating this trend to human behavior,
the issue becomes further complicated because it’s no longer just a question about whether we
can chock up the activities of the sun to deities or physical laws. When humans are involved, it
introduces a new variable; now an explanation can be biological, supernatural, or human based.
A huge question is: is a human explanation equivalent to a biological explanation, and in what
way?
Before we understood such disorders as autism, major anxiety disorder, or depression
(not that we really understand them today), we thought that behaviors of autistic, anxious,
or depressed individuals were indicative of moral depravity, demonic possession, or divine
punishment. The first explanation appears heinous in the modern day because it places blame
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squarely on the shoulders of the individual for things which we understand now to be outside of
their control. The latter two explanations seem to be mislead because they place the blame on
supernatural phenomena when today we have at least some of the necessary research to suspect
an entirely biological explanation. For some behaviors, such as the poor recognition of social
cues by autistic individuals, it seems unfair to blame the individual, and reasonable to provide a
biological explanation as an excuse. For other behaviors, like the choice to drive or walk to the
store, it would seem fair to blame the individual for their choice, and invasive to chock it up to
some series of biological phenomena.
When we enter the realm of scientific explanation, everything seems to come down to
deterministic causality, where every event has its directly related, antecedent cause, and that
the interaction between an event and its cause can be explained by a more or less complicated
physical law. When it comes to human behavior, there seems to be a range of behaviors to
which we can accept applying scientific explanations. How we define this range is often
unclear, and varied widely based on personal belief and across cultures. Some people have no
problem blaming someone with Asperger’s for a selfish behavior, for example, while others
are comfortable excusing it on the basis of the disorder. This waffling has severe implications
for moral theories of responsibility. Does someone with Asperger’s have enough control over
their behavior in such a way that we can definitively say that they could have chosen a different
behavior? If they did have control, then they should be considered responsible for their decision.
If they are responsible, then they can be considered moral or immoral on the basis of whatever
moral or ethical code we are using to judge.
How can we better define this vague sense of blameworthiness in the face of continuing
scientific discovery that explains more and more behaviors? Does the discovery that alcoholism,
for example, is attributable to genetic predisposition mean that alcoholics cannot be blamed
for their choices? Of course not, they are morally reprehensible for their poor decision to drink
excessively and irresponsibly, and likewise, they are morally valiant for their choice to overcome
themselves and quit. At least, this is the case for some. It seems equally naive or ignorant to
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blame all alcoholics for their behavior as it does to blame none of them. The catch is that not
all alcoholics are equally predisposed by their genetics. There are different genetic causes, and
magnitudes of cause for such behavior, which indicates that some people have less control than
others. In order to assign moral responsibility, we need more information. We need to know the
precise genetic background of the individual, and more research is needed to determine which
genetic causes can be controlled and which cannot. As such, scientific research can provide
support for a moral framework. On the other hand, how do we determine if some genetic
component of our behavior is ‘controllable’? What does control mean?
This is where free will comes into play, and where a cooperative project between
philosophy and science can produce new criteria for free willing control that calibrates our
empirical, genetic studies, and that informs our moral framework of which alcoholics are
responsible and which are not. Note that alcoholism is not the only problem that these criteria
can clarify, similar paths toward a solution can be achieved with other behaviors that are tracked
down to genetic predispositions, such as smoking, gambling, and doping. Furthermore, these
solutions are applicable to other forms of behavioral predisposition such as problems with
temperament as a result of upbringing, environmental, or social ques.
Can we blame someone raised in an abusive household for violent anger, for example,
later in life? It certainly wouldn’t seem fair or accurate. More and more research points
to the destructive and robust effects of traumatic and non-traumatic stress on the physical
makeup of our brains, which would thus change how we respond to some stimuli, sometimes
irrevocably. For someone who has been broken down until they no longer have control over
some decision-making skills, then they cannot be blamed for their behavior, as they have no
alternative available to them that they can access. Empirical research can tell us more about
what degree of trauma is required to create such an ingrained change in the brain, what degree
of trauma someone can recover from, and whether a behavior is driven by a controllable or an
uncontrollable pattern of activity in the brain, and therefore whether the behavior is freely willed
or not. These are, of course, advances that will take decades to uncover and optimize for practical
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application, but having a model and a way forward is an important step toward such discoveries.
As I have shown here, sometimes science comes across as being in opposition to the
existence of free will. Science is largely in the business of exploring the deterministic, causal
relations in the world, whereas free will and consciousness seem to be concepts that may not
be described by deterministic laws of nature (as we understand them currently). Some findings
of neuroscience and cognitive psychology point to the idea that consciousness is ‘just’ the
awareness of neural activity in the brain, activity that is unconsciously doing all the work of
decision-making. There are three central responses to these claims: (1) compatibilists who
respond that free will is compatible with determinism, even if it is true that consciousness is not
causally involved; (2) eliminative incompatibilists who hold that free will cannot be compatible
with a deterministic system, and that since science has described the universe deterministically,
that free will is an illusion; (3) libertarian incompatibilists, who agree that free will is not
compatible with determinism, but who also hold that there is indeterminism in the universe,
which provides sufficient criteria for free will to exist.
In opposition to the first group, I will hold that determinism does exclude free will. In
opposition to the second group, I hold that the success of quantum mechanics and the importance
of noise in neural activity shows that we are neither saddled with determinism, nor a lack of
opportunity for free will. My position aligns most with the third perspective, my only issue being
that many Libertarians hold that the tiniest proof of indeterminism in the brain can pave the
way for free will; I suggest that there is evidence for more than a tiny amount of indeterminism,
and that free will extends beyond the domain of indeterminism. I hold that a mixture of
indeterminism and determinism is at work in the brain in such a way that consciousness
wields control over indeterministic neural noise and that through neuroplasticity mechanisms,
consciousness molds neural networks, thereby shaping future activity. I suggest that a great deal
of deterministic, unconscious neural activity operates within networks that have been molded by
consciousness and can be considered an extension of conscious choices. As such, this establishes
the possibility of free will during both conscious and unconscious decision-making.

7
I propose a two stage model of free will during decision-making that can be understood
in terms of neuroscience or practical reasoning. The scientific version of my model shows that,
in the first stage, indeterminism creates noise in neural activity, which provides a series of neural
activity patterns that are available for selection by the agent’s consciousness. When a pattern
is satisfactorily favored by the agent through the direction of endogenous attention, the pattern
molds networks in the brain through neuroplasticity mechanisms. Finally, activity that flows
through this new framework deterministically recruits pre-motor areas and thereby precipitates
action. This process can also be understood in more intuitive terms of practical reasoning. First,
we generate a series of motivations, which are reasons to be or act a certain way. Through
deliberation, we weigh the normative quality of these motivations to ascertain which best fits
our practical identity and which is the most genuinely moving to us. Once we have selected a
normative motivation, this acts as an unbreakable law for us, as we must uphold a law that we
hold ourselves to (if we are genuinely motivated by this reason, then there is no way for us not to
uphold it, because we are rational we must be a law unto ourselves), and we act on the basis of
that reason.
In the chapters that follow, I will be outlining some contemporary perspectives on free
will, proposing a model of free will that hybridizes Libertarianism and concepts from Practical
Reasoning, and introducing contemporary neuroscience that supports my model. The goal of
my first chapter is to set the scene. I will showing how philosophies of free will have been
influenced by scientific discovery, and how, in some cases, a contemporary scientific worldview
seems to conflict with a belief in free will. In this chapter I will focus specifically on three
perspectives that represent the three main camps I discussed earlier: compatibilism, eliminitive
incompatibilism, and Libertarianism. In my second chapter, my proposal will combine
philosophies of free will and practical reasoning to defend a definition of free will as selfgenerated motivation. I will unpack my model at the philosophical level in the second chapter,
while in the third chapter my goal is to stress the ways in which contemporary neuroscience can
support my proposal. Together, this thesis aims to put forward a philosophy of free will that is
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agreeable to some currently opposing perspectives, and that can be flushed out through empirical
study. With hope, I can show that empirical verification can be reconciled with the seemingly
non-empirical aspects of free will, such as responsibility, freedom, and identity.
I acknowledge the magnitude of this project, and I do not claim that this thesis provides
a definitive, comprehensive account single handedly. I do not believe that this thesis even
comes close to sufficiently substantiating a majority of the intricate or the overarching features
of free will, neuroscience, and responsibility. My practical goal is to combine subsets of
different disciplines from philosophy of mind to practical reasoning, from cellular to systems
neuroscience, and in the end I hope to provide an empirically supported, but falsifiable model of
free will. This model could reorient philosophy and science toward a more unified goal in their
respective explorations of free will. In my conclusion I will attempt to briefly demonstrate the
real world applications of this model.
It will become clear in my conclusory chapter that realizing the application of this model
will require a joint effort of both science and philosophy, two disciplines which I consider
prerequisites of each other. My scientific discussion will be carefully mediated by philosophical
analysis, which I believe can, and should be, a guiding torch for science as much as science can
and should be a guiding torch for philosophy. I believe that this approach will establish where we
are and where we need to go. I believe we will come to discover how far away we truly are from
answering this question empirically, though we can also be encouraged in this pursuit by having
a clearer path ahead of us.
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Chapter 1

Free Will as Ability, Liberty, and Illusion
Life is like a game of cards. The hand you are dealt is determinism; the way you play it is free will.
~Jawaharlal Nehru

In this chapter, I will briefly sketch some central philosophical positions on free will
from both philosophers and scientists. As there are so many perspectives, I will have to truncate
my review and focus on a couple positions that will represent clusters of divided views. After
describing each in depth, I will also cite the concerns I have about them. The result will be a set
of problems that any theory should address. In Chapter 2, I will address those problems when I
lay out my position.
The first major division among the perspectives I will describe is the split between
determinism and indeterminism. This division involves a discussion of the fundamental structure
of the universe in which we live. Determinism holds that the laws of nature are determinately
causal, which is to say that all phenomena occur through a set physical framework, a system of
cause and effect wherein every result is directly caused by an antecedent event. For example,
the result of bowling pins getting knocked over is caused by the bowling ball hitting them.
Indeterminism posits that there are crucial components of the world that exist outside of regular
causality, either in being probabilistic, or in being epiphenomenal, and can alter the ways in
which the deterministic pathway proceeds. Probabilistic causality is a theory of causality wherein
the event (the bowling ball hitting the pins) does not necessarily cause the result (the pins falling
over). Rather, the bowling ball is influencing the probability that the pins will fall over, but does
not determine it. Determinism as an idea is ancient, but it gained traction with the expansion
of scientific and mathematical investigation in the eighteenth century, which clarified facts and
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laws in the natural world. In contrast, even more recent scientific discoveries have resulted
in the success of theories of uncertainty and quantum indeterminacy. These have provided
indeterminism with the claim that determinism cannot take into account the inherent probabilistic
nature of sub-atomic motion.
Now, to frame indeterminism in the context of free will. Indeterminism as a position
posits that free will is not compatible with a strictly deterministic causal state of nature (bowling
ball directly and necessarily causes the pins to fall). Further, some arguments for indeterminism
hold that there is no reason to believe the inherent state of nature is deterministically causal.
Panpsychism combines elements of determinism and indeterminism to suggest that free will
cannot emerge in a purely deterministic world, not even from complex systems, as this would
require a miracle. Galen Strawson argues from the position of panpsychism that free will does
exist, and suggests that “all physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy, I trow,
is an experience-involving phenomenon (Strawson, 2006; 18). This is to say that the individual
components of complex systems that build free willing agents all possess in their natures aspects
of consciousness whereby their combination can render consciousness and therefore free will.
Libertarianism is an indeterminist position largely pioneered by Robert Kane, who states
that “there must be times at which the agents are able to choose in more than one way, and to
do so voluntarily, intentionally and rationally, either way they choose” (Kane, 2014; 56) The
libertarian proposal is that free will is an independent source of causality with which we make,
what Kane calls self-forming actions in the face of multiple options.
Determinists fall, primarily, into one of two umbrella camps: Compatibilists and
Incompatibilists. Compatibilists claim that the existence of free will is compatible with, indeed,
some claim it requires, the deterministic causal nature of the world. Incompatibilists, on the
other hand, hold that the nature of a truly free will cannot exist in such a causal realm. Among
the compatibilists are Dennett, and Velleman, who suggest that consciousness and free will
are constant narratives in the existence of our bodies, and McKenna, who holds a naturalist
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perspective and rejects some of the assumptions that libertarians propose are required for the
existence of a freely willed decision.
Incompatibilists hold that free will is not compatible with a deterministic natural world,
but do not make the additional claim that free will exists in the way we feel it does. The scramble
over deciding whether free will is or is not compatible with determinism has been largely pushed
to the fore by the advancement of modern psychology and neuroscience that has cast what seems
to be a discouraging light on the issue. With neuroscientists such as Libet and Haggard, the issue
became how free will can exist if it is clear that consciousness is merely the result, and not the
direct cause, of activity in the brain.
In his famous experiments, Libet tested the timing of brain activity and conscious
awareness proceeding a decision and subsequent action (Libet, 1983). Libet was initially inspired
by the presence of brain activity relevant to the action well before (over 500 ms) the motor
network executed the action. In his experiment, neural activity was recorded in subjects who
were told to perform a simple motor action (flexing their wrist) spontaneously. He found that
neural activity in the motor and pre-motor cortex, readiness potentials, occurred approximately
800 ms before the action was executed, whereas the subjects’ awareness of the intention to
move, which they reported through positioning of a clock hand, occurred about 400 ms before
the action. Thus, prerequisite neural activity preceded conscious awareness, a finding that Libet
refrained from describing as a blow to free will until later (Libet, 1999), when many who read
his work interpreted it as the death of free will.
Many oppose the idea that these experiments annul free will. On numerous occasions
Alfred Mele has rejected their relevance, claiming that they do not invoke moralistic action or
intention and therefore only comment on the conscious awareness of reflexive action (Mele,
2009; Ch.7). In essence, he claims that experiments trying to pry apart the topic of free will can
only claim that the overt actions they investigate “do not have corresponding consciously made
decisions or conscious intentions among their causes” (Mele, 2013; 2). Mele goes on to claim
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that there’s no reason to expect these actions, flexing a wrist, to involve free will. Invoking the
relevance of moral responsibility in the topic of free will, he claims that the actions investigated
have no moral import; flexing a wrist (in the case of an experiment, as opposed to a case where
it might signal an order to kill, for example) does not present a moral decision. There’s no reason
not to do it, so there’s no reason to deliberate, consider pros and cons, and to exercise your free
will to make a choice. Mele posits that, since free will isn’t utilized in the actions investigated,
the studies do not make any claim, positive or negative, about the existence of free will. While
Mele might be correct in asserting that heretofore neuroscience has left the issue wide open,
there is reason to believe that decisions of any sort, with or without moral implication, will
proceed through the same pathway. It’s not like if there are two brains, one acting unconsciously,
the other acting consciously. Both states of processing, conscious and unconscious, proceed
through the same neural pathways. As we will see in Chapter 3, there are just extra mechanisms
involved during conscious processing.
Eliminitive incompatibilists claim that the feeling that our phenomenological aspect of
free will, the part we experience consciously, has a causal role in our decisions is an illusion.
Eliminative incompatibilists claim that unconscious neural activity dictates how the body will
react to external stimulation, whereas our conscious experience of free will is an interpretation
of this unconscious decision. Importantly, this interpretation occurs just before the action
itself, is usually consistent with the action, and is therefore entirely convincing of the idea, the
illusion, that the activity is caused by the conscious intention to act. Illusionism, so it’s called,
is supported by members of the scientific community (Wegner), in addition to philosophers
(Smilansky). Smilansky proposes that “illusion has a large and positive role to play in the
issue of free will” (Smilansky, 2000: 6; see Smilanksy, 2002: 11). More specifically, he says
that “humanity is fortunately deceived on the free will issue, and this seems to be a condition
of civilized morality and personal value” (11). This is seemingly in line with an evolutionary
biological perspective that we evolved to possess this nearly unimpeachable illusion because
it makes for the most productive means, vis a vis moral responsibility and legal systems, to
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preserving our species. Similarly, Wegner wraps his version of illusionism in the proposal that
we would be wrong to think that the illusion of free will denounces its import and prevalence.
In this chapter, I will focus on the potions of Wegner, Kane, and McKenna. These three
will act as representatives of their respective camps (eliminitive incompatibilism, indeterminism,
and compatibilism) in order to simplify the process of describing the variety of positions and the
problems with each that I will address with my position.

Wegner and Free Will as Illusion
Daniel Wegner uses mental pathology and strange phenomena that distort perceptions of
agency (trance states, Ouiji board spelling) as a framework for his theory of free will. He uses
cases in which people act without willing it or will it without acting to study that he calls the
theory of apparent mental causation.
To begin, Wegner describes a relatively obscure, but frightening pathological case
of action without will: alien hand syndrome. He explains that alien hand syndrome is a
neuropsychological disorder wherein the patient experiences the movement of their hand as if it
had a mind of its own, a result of damage to specific region of the brain on the side contralateral
to the alien hand. One patient’s hand would:
Tenaciously grope for and grasp any nearby object, pick and pull at her clothes, and
even grasp her throat during sleep... She slept with the arm tied to prevent nocturnal
misbehavior. She never denied that her left arm and hand belonged to her, although
she did refer to her limb as though it were an autonomous entity (Banks et al., 1989;
p. 456)
This example highlights the difficulty of understanding an experiential phenomenon as it can
only be self-reported by the individual that they willed an action or not. In the case of someone
with alien hand syndrome, it may appear to a third person perspective that the patient willingly
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moved their hand, yet the patient would point out, most likely with fear and dread, that they did
not have the conscious experience of authoring the movement of their hand. This is an example
of a person who can perform an action while the feeling of doing it is absent.
These two variables, doing and the feeling of doing, delineate four ways in which we
can experience action and will. Doing something and not feeling that we’ve done it, like with
alien hand syndrome, results in a condition Wegner calls automatism. On the flip side, not doing
something and feeling like we have is an illusion of control, like people thinking they control
the function of a machine by pressing a button when the button really only works on random
occasions (as is the case in some psychology experiments that test the range of our sense of
contingency between pressing a button and something happening). Wegner calls these the special
cases; normally, our activities fall into one of two other options: not doing something and not
feeling like we’re doing it (or normal inaction), and doing something and feeling that we’ve done
it (normal voluntary action). Wegner’s position is a little weak in that he leaves it unclear how
we can and should distinguish between all of these cases, most of them requiring self-reportage,
which may not be possible, or may not be truthful. This inability to distinguish clearly is one
problem that I will address in my proposal.
What is most interesting, in light of how pathology can alter our perception of normal
voluntary action, is how voluntary action works. To determine whether our experience of free
will is capable of causing neural activity, we must determine if it can be observed as a path of
cause and effect. Causality, Wegner points out, “is an event, not a thing or a characteristic or
attribute of an object” (Wegner, 2004; 3), so we cannot rely on the sense that our experience
inherently plays a causal role. We must investigate if experience can be empirically identified as
a cause of an observable effect.
Philosophers and scientists familiar with the works of Libet (wherein readiness potentials
are present and initiating action before the conscious will to do so) and Wegner become startled
by the concept that free will requires empirical verification. If this is the case, then surely we
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will lose free will entirely because the science seems to imply that conscious experience is a
byproduct, and therefore does not play a role in the pathway of cause and effect. In Wegner’s
precis to his book, The Illusion of Free Will, he includes a section for open peer commentary, and
a follow up response section. In his responses, he cites a couple positions from neurosurgeons
and psychologists (Bogen, Kihlstrom, and Zuriff) whose peer commentary reflect the
interpretation that the experience of free will is an illusion according to Wegner’s argument.
Wegner distinguishes between empirical and phenomenological free will.
Phenomenological free will is the experience, or sensation, of free will. Wegner posits that the
experience does not have a causal role in our actions. In his terms, the experience of free will is
not predictive enough of action for it to be a valid causal factor. We’ve seen how the correlation
between the ‘feeling of doing’ and actually ‘doing’ can vary as a result of pathology, strange
phenomena, or plain trickery on the part of psychology researchers. Wegner makes an even
stronger case by elaborating a variety of cases with misconstrued phenomenological free will,
such as the patient with alien hand syndrome. By observing the lack of predictive power that the
experience of free will has on our actions, we can determine that it cannot play a causal role in
all action.
On the other hand, Wegner describes the empirical free will as the “real causal sequence
underlying human behavior” in which “each of our actions is really the culmination of an
intricate set of physical and mental processes” (5). Interestingly, Wegner is sure to point out that
this includes “psychological mechanisms that correspond to the traditional concept of will – in
that they involve linkages between our thoughts and our actions” (5).
This is a concise, logical argument that culminates in Wegner’s theory of apparent mental
causation where people “experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as
the cause of their action” (6). Wegner proposes three key sources of this interpretation: priority,
consistency, and exclusivity. Thus, according to his theory of apparent mental causation, we
have the feeling of control, as agents of our actions, when our thoughts (A) precede said action,
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(B) are consistent with the performance of said action, and (C) when we do not perceive an
overwhelming sense of alternative causes of said action. These sensations converge into a strong
feeling of authorship, which we experience as conscious will, as “Yeah, I did that.” Wegner
argues that this feeling is an illusion of control we obtain from the rapid interpretation of many
coincidental sensations. As Wegner writes with sobering conciseness, “experiences of conscious
will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself – not from processes whereby
mind creates action” (1). He claims that the experience of free will itself does not have sway over
actions. The experience is only an interpretation of the events in our brain that cause the action.
Wegner presents a fascinating example of how an action that is clearly not caused by us,
the moving of a tree branch, can feel authored if these three factors aligned. If you imagined that
branch moving and then it moved, and moved exactly as you imagined, and was not caused by
anything else, like a squirrel, you would probably, first, be very taken aback and then, second,
begin to consider, no matter how absurd it seems, that you might have caused the movement.
Imagine that this predictiveness occurred all-day every-day as you interpreted the actions your
body performs: you would no longer consider it strange and would assume, as we do, that we,
that is, our conscious wills, have caused the action.
Wegner is very aware that this arouses fear that we will lose free will, and he is very
careful to distinguish, again, that he is only calling the experience of free will an illusion, not
the empirical fact that mental events can influence our actions. However, I do not agree that
he addresses these concerns enough. He asks why this experience exists: “What good is an
epiphenomenon?” (8) and claims that phenomenal free will provides us with a sense that our
body has authored an action, like how emotions provide us with a sense of how our body is
responding to events. As, such, conscious will “serves to accentuate and anchor an action in the
body” in a way that “renders the act one’s own in a personal and memorable way” (10, emphasis
added). Ultimately, conscious will is an important check that “serves as an indicator of mental
processes or states, and that thus informs us about the status of our own mental systems” (10).
My contention is: who is the ‘us’ in that sentence. Is ‘us’ our conscious will? If so, is making our
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conscious will aware of this check advantageous even if there’s no way for ‘us’, our conscious
will, to turn around and use that knowledge to reorient the body? What makes more sense is that
‘us’ means our unconscious brain. This would this suggest that consciousness is just a tool the
brain uses to check up on itself.
Wegner’s claim is that this is enough. We can rest assured that our body has empirical
free will, which is to say that the actions our bodies perform are influenced by mental events.
Even if our conscious will lacks true causal control, it is, in the end, usually an accurate
interpretation of what is actually happening in the brain. Given this position Wegner describes a
philosophy of responsibility taking into account the acausal nature of conscious will. He claims
that:
Causality is something you can see in mechanical systems, a relationship between
events, and is not dependent on what kinds of events are involved. Responsibility,
on the other hand, involves persons – those selves that are constructed through the
process of identifying actions as caused by an agent (39).
Thus, responsibility and causality are like apples and oranges to Wegner. Equating responsibility
to causality is a mistake to Wegner.
Responsibility is a human question that involves our unique ‘selves’, and our sense
of authorship. Wegner writes that “the allocation of responsibility is dependent on regarding
something as a person,” because only a person can regard oneself as a person, and only
something that regards itself as a person can “take an intentional stance toward itself” (39).
According to Wegner, the intentional stance occurs naturally through the power of the illusion
of phenomenological free will. When we take this intentional stance toward ourselves the
“real work of responsibility is done” because the accused person “accepts responsibility and
experiences moral emotions such as shame or guilt (or in the case of positive actions, pride)”
(39). While I agree with this perspective, that a great deal of work could be done by such an
illusion, to which I will return in Chapter 2, I object with the claim that causality is not relevant
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to responsibility.
Just as much as our feeling of guilt in the face of action is based on thinking we have
control, an equal and opposite feeling of innocence can be based on thinking we do not have
control. Can we merely trust that this illusion of free will is infallible, unimpeachable? I believe
that some of the strength of this illusion is endowed by the cultural background in which we
are raised. From the youngest point when we can be considered thinking human beings, we are
raised with the assumption of choice, and responsibility. Some people end up feeling responsible
for different things merely because there were raised to believe they are responsible for some
things and not others. This indicates the influence of cultural background over the illusion. If we
accept, unanimously, that the experience of free will is an illusion, and this becomes common
knowledge that future generations are raised believing, who’s to say if they will feel the same
sense of intention toward themselves?
As such, my problems with Wegner’s view are as follows:
1. He does not provide sufficient guidelines for how to distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary action, especially in light of his claim that phenomenological free will is
not properly predictive.
2. He does not sufficiently address what the goal of the phenomenological free will is, if
it has no causal role.
3. He does not account for the fact that sensations of free will are changed by our social
and personal conception of responsibility.
4. He does not account for empirical findings that consciousness does have a causal role
in decision making and information processing in the brain.

Kane and Free Will as Liberty
Robert Kane has been the dean of Libertarian philosophy for decades. He has
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summarized his and other Libertarians positions on countless occasions, and single handedly
written and edited a library of books and articles on the topic of free will, including the Oxford
Handbook of Free Will. His most recent article is a succinct 2012 contribution to a symposium
on Mark Balageur’s book, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, in which he, Kane that is,
compares and contrasts his position with that of Balageur’s, a fellow libertarian. I will start
toward the end of this piece, “Torn decisions, luck, and libertarian free will: comments on
Balaguer’s free will as an open scientific problem,” where he more clearly defines his position,
and then work my way through the beginning when he distinguishes key aspects of his theory,
which should highlight some of the diversity in Libertarian perspectives.
Philosophical Libertarianism, in general, holds that the human capacity for choice is
incompatible with the domain of physical determinism of any sort. Thus, libertarianism holds
an indeterminist stance about the way our consciousness makes decisions. For the most part,
disagreement among Libertarian philosophers centers around what the nature of indeterminism is
as it presents in the brain, and at what step in a decision making process it occurs.
Within the range of Libertarian views, Kane identifies Self-Forming Actions (SFAs) and
Plural Voluntary Control (PVC) as central pillars of his position. SFAs are those activities in
the brain over which the individual has indeterministic control and therefore define the range of
activities for which an agent is responsible. It is the process by which an agent self-determines a
choice, or decides which option is the most desireable, or best in some way. In being the origin of
this decision, not having been deterministically influenced by the exterior world, we would have
control over and thereby responsibility for actions precipitated by those choices. Kane is careful
to note that “not all acts done of our own free wills have to be undetermined, only those acts by
which we made ourselves into the kinds of persons we are—namely, the “will-setting” or “selfforming actions” (SFAs) that are required for ultimate responsibility” (2007, 26). This is to say
that the import of SFAs rests in their enabling us to generate a decision about choices that define
who we are, or choices with which we identify and of which we can consider ourselves agents.
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The libertarian view of free will shares a great deal of qualities with my own, however, I
disagree with what Kane distinguishes as most important for the existence of free will, and with
the likelihood of certain factors having a role. Kane declares that free will is “the power of agents
to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes” (1996,
4). The reader will note that this relates very closely to my theory of free will as I briefly noted
in the introduction: “Free will is our ability to be free to choose, to generate our own decision
without the complete control of our biological makeup and external circumstances… Being
able to generate our own unique motivation for a given action is free will.” Self-forming actions
are what make us the ultimate creators, or originators, of our own ends and purposes. SFAs are
something that we consciously create in order to precipitate actions toward our purposes.
How do we come to create these SFAs? Kane writes that SFAs “are the end-products of
goal-directed or teleological cognitive processes in the brain in which indeterminism in some of
the neural events involved in these cognitive processes functions as a hindrance or obstacle to
the attainment of their goals” (2012, 56). Thus, he identifies indeterminacy in the brain as a key
factor by establishing requisite obstacles. In providing difficulty, the indeterminacy behooves us
to make an effort toward one goal or another. As such, SFAs present an effort of will to proceed
toward one goal or another that is distinguished from when the brain merely proceeds through
unhindered, deterministic pathways toward thermodynamically favored results.
The way in which we create SFAs requires a condition that Kane calls Plural Voluntary
Control (PVC). According to Kane:
Agents have plural voluntary control over a set of options (e.g. choices) when they
are able to bring about whichever of the options or choices they will to bring about,
when they will to do so, for the reasons they will to do so, on purpose, rather than
accidentally or inadvertently or by mistake, without being coerced or compelled in
doing so or willing to do so or otherwise controlled in doing so or willing to do so
by other agents or mechanisms (2012, 56).
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Essentially, Kane is describing the PVC nature of free willing causality as a situation wherein
an agent is confronted by multiple possible options and has the liberty to “choose in more than
one way,” hence plural, and is performing this choice in a way that is not influenced by external
mechanisms, or, in other words, is able to choose “voluntarily, intentionally and rationally”
(2012, 56), hence voluntary control.
Kane distinguishes between his theory of PVC with a common Libertarian theory that
only requires Alternative Possibilities (AP) to satisfy free will. AP allows for what was originally
thought of as an ambiguous future where the result is not predictable to one, single, determined
solution based on the given causes. Kane argues that AP is not enough (though it is part of the
solution), there must be the factor of effort required to achieve one possibility or another, this is
the ‘willing’ component of free willing.
Kane also refers to these goal-directed cognitive processes as ‘volitional streams.’ This
allows him to elaborate further on the nature of control, or liberty, that an agent has over a
decision. Kane posits that “one must allow that there can be multiple such volitional streams
within the agent,” which vaguely appeals to the theory of AP, “the agent must have a certain
kind of control over each of these volitional streams,” and “the choice that results from either
of the volitional streams can be said to be brought about by the agent” (2012, 57), which
assures that the agent represents the origin of the choice, the creator of the decision to proceed
through one volitional stream or another. Kane concludes that “it is owing to the fact that either
volitional stream might succeed in attaining its goal, which would thereby be brought about by
the agent’s goal-directed cognitive process, that the agent exercises plural voluntary control over
the decision itself (the SFA)” (2012, 57). Thus, Kane posits that control over the choice and the
effort of willing one choice or another are two pillars of SFAs, which enable agents to act with
free will.
Let’s look more closely at what Kane identifies as an indeterminacy in the brain. In
agreement with Balageur, Kane cites the existence of “microlevel indeterminacies in the timings
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of firings of individual neurons that would give rise to some background neural noise.” Kane
argues that these low level effects, which are currently understood to be a result of quantum
uncertainty, are enough for free will. While some claim that the brain as a whole, and the
decisions and actions it generates, is too many orders of magnitude too large for these low level
indeterminacies to have any noticeable effect, Kane claims that this is okay. “One doesn’t need
a thunderclap of indeterminism in the brain to get free will,” he writes, “just a sprinkle will do”
(2012, 52). The precise nature of these microlevel indeterminacies will be examined more in
the proceeding chapters. However, given this stance, I will state, now, that I disagree that this
“sprinkle” is enough for free will. Kane is underselling the import of indeterminism and how
it influences the higher structures of the brain. If the indeterminacies are indeed erased through
supersession by orders of magnitude of complexity, and if these indeterminacies only amount to
a random, content-less, neural noise, then this would account for the existence of APs, but not
of a radical PVC, which Kane claims is necessary for free will. Of course, I cannot blame Kane
for not pursuing the science himself, but I object with his accepting that this, as he recounts, is at
best an open scientific question. Given his account of what we currently know, it doesn’t seem
like PVC is part of the equation. Ultimately, I disagree with how he interprets the science; there
is scientific support for a great deal more indeterminacy in the brain than a sprinkle, albeit not a
thunderclap.
In opposition to Balageur, Kane insists that self-forming actions, which Balageur calls
torn decisions, cannot be only phenomenological, or experience based. If they were, they would
only represent the way in which our decisions feel like they were not deterministic, while
leaving the options open for whether or not they were determined on an ontological level. Kane
claims that “one cannot resolve free will questions by appeal to introspection alone” (2012, 53).
Balageur only represents his torn decisions phenomenologically, but if he also meant for them
to have implications on an ontological level, then, Kane insists, “they would amount to my
SFAs” (2012, 53). This is only a semantic disagreement between them, but it reminds us of a key
requirement for free will: that it must not be just phenomenological. Recall Wegner’s distinction
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between phenomenological free will and empirical free will. In order for Kane’s libertarian
free will to exist, the phenomenology of free will must have a causal influence on the physical
actions (the empirical, or ontological aspect) of the brain. We must be at liberty to act upon the
world, and ourselves, in the way we wish. Otherwise, we slip back into Wegner’s view that the
phenomenology of free will is an illusion that convinces us to treat empirical free will in the
same way as we would treat conscious free will.
It is important to establish the radical nature of Kane’s view as a libertarian. Many
libertarians are satisfied by simple two-stage models of free will. Two stage models represent an
explanation of free will that dates back to William James, who articulated that free will could
be defined as a chance occurrence of alternative possibilities, followed by a choice made by
the agent to execute one choice or the other. Kane poses a stronger two stage model wherein
practical choices (procedural things like deciding how to get from the attic hideout to the safe
house two streets away) are readily explained in this model, while moral choices (should I escape
to the safe house, or turn myself in) require a more controlled version of the first, chance stage.
His PVC theory describes how the role of indeterminacy in rendering the choice difficult to
make forces the agent to exert effort, to will a choice. This added requirement places Kane in a
somewhat extreme place as far as libertarians are concerned.
Thus, my concerns with Kane’s Libertarian perspective are as follows:
1. Where do we draw the line at actions that have “made ourselves into the kinds of
persons we are”? Does this involve intention vs. no intention, endorsement vs. no
endorsement? Kane doesn’t say.
2. Kane suggests that only a sprinkle of indeterminacy, and thus of the potential for free
will, is enough. Maybe a sprinkle would be the bare minimum, but there is evidence
for more.
3. Kane discusses goal-oriented behavior as the source of SFAs, but does not discuss how
intention and motivation lead an agent to select one goal over another. According to
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Kane, it is unclear whether a free willing agent has control over the goal they pursue
with the libertarian free will he describes.

McKenna and Free Will as Ability
The central strength of Michael McKenna’s compatibilist position is the defence of Harry
Frankfurt’s position that refutes the need for Alternative Possibilities. Frankfurt suggests that if
a decision is morally significant and the agent has control, then there is no need for alternative
possibilities. Opposition from incompatibilists suggests that this implicitly assumes that the
entire process is deterministic, and therefore contentious in another way. McKenna defends
Frankfurt by claiming that an example can be made wherein only some alternative possibilities
are blocked while a decision is in control of the agent and is therefore morally significant.
As a compatibilist, McKenna is interested in diffusing incompatibilist objections to
determinism. He writes that the incompatibilist holds that, “determinism rules out free will and
moral responsibility by ruling out an agent’s access to alternative possibilities,” (2003, 201) the
assumption being that, in a determinist network, all effects are directly the result of their causes,
going all the way back to the origin of the deterministic universe, at which point all fate was
sealed. In rebuttal, McKenna is determined to show that “if free will and moral responsibility do
not require alternative possibilities, then this incompatibilist argument is otiose” (2003, 201).
McKenna has designed the “Brain Malfunction” example of Casper the philosophy
professor as a demonstration of free will without alternative possibilities at the moment of
choice. Casper comes across a state of the art ‘Make-it-the-Case-Device’. The machine has a
large screen, on which flashes a genie who explains:
Casper, just beneath this screen are two buttons, one marked ‘The Morally
Good Thing To Do’ and another marked ‘The Morally Bad Thing To Do’. Let us
abbreviate them as ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ respectively. If you press the Bad button you
will immediately make it the case that one million dollars are deposited into your
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bank account. The money will be drawn, in one dollar increments, from the savings
accounts of one million college professors. The transaction will be untraceable.
If you press the Good button you will immediately make it the case that an entire
village of people in the Amazon is cured of an otherwise fatal disease. Saving the
villagers will not involve any money and by doing so you will not be stealing from
your peers. You cannot select both buttons and this opportunity will not present
itself again. You have ten seconds to select your option (2003, 209-210).
I will directly quote the remainder of the example because the precise language is important:
A timer appears on the screen and begins to count down from ten.
Casper pauses to consider these two options, quickly assessing the import of each.
He considers the article he read in last Sunday’s New York Times on the villagers’
plight. He is fully aware of the urgency of their condition. He also considers his
sparse salary as a philosophy professor and he squirms at the thought of stealing
from his peers. Imagining that shiny, red Mercedes convertible roadster in the
window, as the counter ticks away from 3 seconds to 2 greedily he takes the plunge
and presses the Bad button. ‘Ah, dinner out tonight!’ Casper thinks to himself.
As it turns out, although Casper was unaware of this difficulty, and although there
is no reason Casper should have been aware of this difficulty, at the time at which
Casper greedily decided to press the Bad button, Casper had a small lesion on his
brain that blocked the neural pathway constitutive of (or correlated with) a decision
to push the Good button during that ten second interval. Casper could not have
decided to press the Good button (2003, 210).
This example seeks to highlight the idea that a morally significant decision (pressing the bad
button) can present without alternative possibilities (like being unable to press the good button
because a lesion prevented that decision) and still be under the control of the agent, because he
used reason to consider the options and decide, before lesioning occurred, that the desire for
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money is most significant. His relief after the decision (‘Ah, dinner out tonight’), in addition
to the envy just before (shiny, red mercedes convertible roadster) indicates that he conducted
reasonable deliberation that voluntarily and intentionally resulted in the choice to press the Bad
button. Thus, even if he didn’t have the alternative to press the Good button at the moment of
choice, he still had the ‘control’ to make the choice he did, and it was indeed morally significant.
The thrust of the example lies in the fact that all moments leading up to the decision were
unaffected by the lesion. Only at the precise moment when the ‘final act of deciding’ occurred,
I gather from the example and the theory that follows, did the lesion appear, blocking the
alternative pathway. McKenna’s opposition to the need for alternative possibilities is unique in
that it does not try to block the need for all decisions, only those that are morally significant. And
nor does it block all components of deliberation. In contrast, the many defenses of Frankfurt’s
proposal (that APs are unnecessary) have almost exclusively “attempted to pollute all actional
pathways other than the actual one in which the agent acts” (2003, 205). From this I understand
that McKenna distinguishes between steps, or actional pathways, in the decision making process,
such as (1) when Casper deliberates on his income and the fancy car outside, and (2) the step of
the exact decision, when he eschews all else and presses the button. All the preliminary moments
(deliberations, etc.) can obey the need for APs, because they are not morally significant. On
the other hand, during the moment of moral significance, the decision itself, the need for APs
shatters and determinism displays a route for free will to exist.
In his words, McKenna claims that a defense of Frankfurt’s philosophy that APs are
unnecessary should “attempt to close off all morally significant alternatives without attempting
to pollute all alternative actional pathways within an agent’s control” (2003, 206). In order to
pursue such a theory, McKenna insists that a “Frankfurt-defender” should distinguish between
“some class of actional pathways comprising morally insignificant alternatives,” which, he writes
are those that “could not aid in grounding the judgment that an agent in a Frankfurt example
is morally responsible for what she does” (2003, 206). In the case of Casper, the alternatives
to pressing the bad button were not considered “deliberatively significant” and are therefore
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irrelevant to the moral decision. Only those deliberations prior to the decision are relevant.
Thus, the existence of alternative possibilities in the wake of these deliberations, is unnecessary,
because they, alone, determine what the decision will be. Due to the lack of indeterminism in
between the deliberation and the decision, the relevance of any alternatives is negated because
there is a direct causal link, and therefore a reliable contingency of the final decision on the
deliberation. McKenna’s theory is called the Limited Blockage Strategy, because it takes aim at
blocking APs for only the morally relevant step while displaying a determinist framework for a
decision resulting in moral responsibility.
McKenna’s Limited Blockage Strategy refutation of theories requiring APs, or theories
opposing Frankfurt’s assertion that all APs are irrelevant, credits the decision, and not the
prerequisites to the decision (intentions, deliberations) with moral importance over all else.
The goal of McKenna’s position is to block the need for alternative possibilities for the parts of
decision-making that are morally significant, thereby dismantling the indeterminist need for APs
during moral decision-making. As such, he holds that it doesn’t matter what deliberation leads
up to the decision, only the decision and the proceeding action are morally significant, and since
he has shown that APs are unnecessary for the decision to be freely willed, his argument appears
successful.
Some deliberations will not contribute to the decision, according to McKenna, and
therefore do not represent morally salient material. This is tantamount to the idea that we can’t
be held responsible for thought, only action; it doesn’t matter if we hate someone, we cannot be
held responsible for that alone. Only if we commit hateful acts are we morally responsible. If
this sounds too strong (what about hateful speech?), I would hold, and I’m sure McKenna would
agree, that speech and expression of thought counts as action, and therefore as something that
behooves punishment if it is a moral wrong. This theory neatly aligns with our legal framework
for responsibility in which we can not be punished for our thoughts if we keep them to ourselves.
I object to the idea that the brain lesion does not inhibit free will, and in my objection I
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appeal to the goal of this legal framework with which McKenna seems to be aligning. The reason
why thought isn’t punishable is that thought is subject to change, immediate and unpredictable
change, and does not perfectly predict action. Just because someone seems to think in one way,
does not mean they will act that way as well. This grants people a kind of second chance. If they
hate someone and have every intention to hurt them, a truly morally reprehensible person might
go through with their intentions, having no reservations, only malice, whereas a person who
may be good at heart will have reservations that would lead them to choose not to hurt another.
The person could have been confused or in a state of vulnerability when they reasoned that the
subject of their hate deserves to be hurt. The assumption our legal framework makes is that
anyone could ‘come to their senses’ at the final moment and execute a choice that had little to
no visible prerequisite beliefs (should I cite something here?). Thus, the alternative option must
remain a possibility until the cessation of cognitive processes involved in precipitating the action,
and until all actional pathways are completed.
McKenna may refute this, claiming that any act of ‘coming to our senses’ would
involve additional actional pathways that are as much morally insignificant as those prior. If
this objection were to be made, I would suggest that our understanding of the actual stages of
decision-making, as far as neuroscience has elucidated, are incomplete. However, what we do
know is that decision-making includes a great deal of complex recurrent networks, monitoring,
and feedback mechanisms. To isolate a precise moment of ‘decision’ from the neural activity
before it disregards the complexity of this network, which also includes activity in the wake of
a decision that continues to regulate the subsequent action. There is no point at which a decision
is made and all relevant cognition ceases, waiting for the action to be carried through and to
receive new information and start over for the next action. Deliberation is not a strictly predecision phenomenon, it continues to influence the nature of a decision and how we execute the
appropriate actions after a ‘decision’ has been made.
If McKenna considers deliberation to be morally irrelevant, then what distinguishes
deliberation from decision? Willed action from reflex? It seems like the causal involvement of

29
consciousness in the decision making process is pivotal for an action to be considered morally
salient. At the very least, conscious intent is pivotal for legal ramifications.
It would be foolish of me to claim that all thought has moral significance. It seems
clear to me that there is a clear line between ‘idle thought’, in which our mind wanders and
experiments in ways we have no intention of bringing about, and ‘intentional thought’, in
which we deliberate on our precise intentions in a way that influences our subsequent action. I
propose that intentional conscious thought is morally significant, and under control of the agent,
and required for a freely willed decision. These two kinds of thought are distinguished by the
presence of intention.
1. Thus, my objections to McKenna can be summarized as follows:
2. He inaccurately isolates a decision from its intentional deliberation.
3. He claims that APs are unnecessary for free will, but allows them for the intentional
deliberation leading up to the decision.
4. He claims that the lack of APs is not tantamount to predetermination.
5. He does not discuss the need to generate the decision consciously, or discuss why
deliberation isn’t considered more relevant to the decision.
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Chapter 2

Self-Generating Motivation
You are who you choose to be.
~Hogarth Hughes, from “The Iron Giant”

A discussion of free will involves a great number of words that are used in everyday
speech (e.g. intention, reason, and choice), as well as some large, but familiar concepts (e.g.
responsibility, morality, and freedom). In order to broach the topic of free will, we must first
agree on the meaning of our terms. There is no way to discuss each term and then the next in a
linear fashion, so I will have trouble describing this constellation of terms clearly. First I will
indulge in a brief etymological analysis, then we can dive into the terminology of practical
reasoning, and finally I will summarize my position and the specific, philosophical concerns that
it can address.
The import of free will in human life is obvious. Terminology surrounding free will
can be traced back to some of the oldest recorded languages, which highlights the fact that the
concept of free will has been central to human life and communication for millennia. We can
trace the etymological history of volition, a term closely related to free will, from vurita and
varam in ancient Sanskrit languages, to Old Slavic veleti, to command, volt in Old Latin, and
volo, I wish, in Latin. From volo come the words “volition”, “voluntary”, and “malevolent/
benevolent”, to name a few. Volition describes the sense in which we have a wish in mind, and
we order ourselves to perform it.
A related word is “will”, whose etymological roots return to the Old Slavic veleti and go
down the path of the Gothic wili and wiljan, to wish. From wiljan comes the German wollen,
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Old English willa, Middle English wille, and our modern day word, will, whose definition I will
compare directly to that of volition in the following section. Will, alone, doesn’t suggest that I
don’t just have a wish or a desire to see something happen, will implies the wherewithal to bring
something about for a reason. With the invocation of reason comes the invocation of practical
reasoning.

Free Will and Practical Reasoning
Practical Reasoning is a field of philosophy that parses out how we think about things.
As the name implies, the human ability to reason is the center of exploration. Practical reason is
the human ability to apply reason through reflection and deliberation in order to decide in what
way to act. While this pursuit seems to directly invoke the question of free will, it is interesting
to note that the more metaphysical theories of free will do not strike philosophers of practical
reasoning as a primary concern. This is because ‘practical’ reason is about how reasoning is
applied and the consequences of its application, not how or whether reason can originate freely.
It is assumed that our reason brings about our action through deliberation, and that our reason
is either rational or irrational. Whether our rationality or irrationality is freely willed or not is
not up to debate between philosophers in this field; however, I believe that practical reasoning
has a great deal to offer questions of free will because of the fact that it addresses the topic of
what comes next (of what we do with our free will) without being stymied by debate over the
fundamental question of whether or not we have free will. I also find that some terminology and
questions that are used in practical reasoning are more readily translatable into empirical study,
which bridges the mostly abstract conversation about free will and the observation based process
of science.
When a reason is sufficient enough to precipitate an action, it is a normative motivation.
A reason is normative if it doesn’t just explain why I am doing something (ie “I’m escaping
through this trap door because the police are hot on my heels), but can verify what is moving me
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to act, which tells us what about the action we endorse as right (ie “Having the police hot on my
heels is what motivates me to snatch what little remains of this burned manuscript and escape
through this trap door”). In the field of practical reasoning, we endorse things because we value
them. We value one thing over another based on our identity. We identify ourselves as a certain
kind of person, which behooves us to hold certain things of value, to endorse them as genuine
motivators, as normative, and thereby act on them. Ultimately, motivation comes down to our
identity, and how it compels us to uphold the values it entails. Reasoning is the process by which
we measure reasons against the values of our identity to decide which reasons we endorse as
normative, as genuinely motivating us to act.
Christine Korsgaard has written a great deal in the field of practical reasoning on
motivation, identity, and morality. In “The Sources of Normativity,” she discusses the basis of
ethics in human life as well as how, and why, we should and do obey ethical laws. She writes that
“the reflective structure of human consciousness requires that you identify yourself with some
law or principle, which will govern your choices. It requires you to be a law to yourself. And that
is the source of normativity” (103-104).
The human ability to be self-aware is universally recognized (I can recognize that
I am writing this, and you are aware that you are reading it, unless one of us has a severe
neuropathological disorder, which I hope and assume is not the case). We are even aware,
frequently, of the precise way in which the stages of deliberation proceed (I need to prevent the
police from reading these papers, but I don’t have time to burn them with this lighter one at a
time, but being caught with them is worse than being caught without them... maybe I have time
to cross the room and toss them all in the dying embers of the fireplace, etc., etc.... until we
decide we don’t have enough time to deliberate on the best route and simply toss them in the fire,
making sure to pull the rug back over the trapdoor as we steal away). Science has yet to elaborate
the physical mechanisms behind this capacity of self-awareness. Whatever the mechanism, given
our reflective psychology as we understand it now, we have the ability to distance ourselves from
ourselves, to segregate between our thoughts/deliberations and our choices.
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Philosophers of practical reasoning would call this a segregation between a thinking self
and an active self. This is not to suggest that we are split between two selves, rather, these are
two sides of the same self. I find that this segregation splits our self roughly in the same way that
I do later in this chapter (when I address Alternative Possibilities): between (1) the mechanisms
of deliberation where I propose indeterminism is amplified, and (2) the mechanism when the
“final” choice is made and determinism regains control over the causal network in order to
ensure a straightforward causal link between the prior deliberations/intentions and the action. As
such, I will proceed to use the terminology of thinking and acting selves because it simplifies the
conversation.
According to Korsgaard, our active selves must unquestioningly submit to the legislation
of our thinking selves. She writes that, “we are in a position to require things of ourselves...
we have legislative authority over ourselves” (151). This means that your reflective nature
dictates your choices according to the most legitimate authority you have: yourself. Korsgaard’s
argument invokes a Voluntarist position, which suggests that motivation flows through a pathway
of obligation, which is assigned by a legitimate authority figure (e.g. God, the government,
parents), who has the power to enforce the law. In contrast to the Voluntarist position, Korsgaard
claims that being normatively obligated by a legitimate authority is considered free will because
the only legitimate authority is yourself, not God, not the government, not even your parents (as
hard as the notion is to shake). Of course, we can acknowledge that the laws of a government, or
the principles of your parents’ household are just and right, but Korsgaard would hold that we are
obligating ourselves to uphold that law, and only we can do that. If you obligate yourself, you are
appealing to your autonomy, which governs your choices freely. The capacity to appeal to your
own autonomy through reflection with your thinking self is what Korsgaard means by being a
law to yourself. Being a reflective human makes you follow a law or principle that is dictated by
yourself.
Our practical identity dictates what laws and principles we will follow. The way you
advocate for a law, under which to rule yourself, is by valuing one over another, a philosophical
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position that almost assumes Alternative Possibilities. The way you, as a reflective human,
advocate for “the principle or law by which you determine your actions” is by assessing which
one is the law that “you regard as being expressive of yourself” (100). In this way, you value a
certain law that is expressive of your identity. Your identity is the way you define yourself, and
your practical identity includes the requisite principles you must follow in order to have assumed
a given identity. You choose what practical identity you associate with, and follow the principles
that such an identity is bound to follow. Being a rational agent means that you follow a law that
you have valued by defining yourself as someone who is disposed to follow such a law.
A rational agent is one who is disposed to make rational, law abiding (personal law, not
necessarily communal law abiding), decisions based in reason. As Korsgaard put it, “because the
will is a causality, it must act according to some law or other... since the will is practical reason,
it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for no reason” (97-98). Thus, being normatively
obligated to make a choice by yourself is a force of causality that follows a prescribed set of
laws. I contend that free will is both a causality and, at some juncture, an independent source of
indeterminism, which enables our freedom up to the point when we select a practical identity and
thus generate a reason for our actions ourselves. After this point our rational nature kicks in and
enables our will to be a causality in the way that philosophers of practical reasoning describe.
The importance of identity in practical reasoning is part of what makes the use of
philosophies like Korsgaard’s so advantageous for my position on free will. For me, and this
will become clear in the next section where I lay out my position, the importance of identity
in calibrating decision-making during complex problem solving demonstrates the importance
of a conscious mechanism for deliberating on our choices. Further, it establishes how our
unconscious decisions can fall under the umbrella of free willed choice when it aligns with
values we endorse as normative for our practical identity. Metaphysical positions on free will,
such as those described in Chapter 1, rarely focus on the importance of identity. Wegner doesn’t
explicitly address identity in the wake of his philosophy, but he does hint at it through his
response to peer reviews on the topic of responsibility. For Daniel Dennett, whom I will address
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in Chapter 3, an illusionist position such as Wegner’s doesn’t necessarily exclude the capacity for
free will, and he reconciles it by holding that we have a personal narrative that acts as a practical
identity that is continuously shaped by our brain for our consciousness to observe.
Korsgaard makes the strong claim that free will and Immanuel Kant’s categorical
imperative exist by necessity, and that this is not really up to debate. As she writes, “occasionally
one meets the objection that the freedom that we discover in reflection is a delusion. Human
actions are causally determined. The philosopher’s bugbear, the Scientific World View,
threatens once more to deprive us of something we value” (94). However, she concludes that
“Determinism is no threat to freedom” (95), though she also notes that this “doesn’t mean that
I am claiming that our experience of our freedom is scientifically inexplicable” (96). According
to Korsgaard, freedom is ensured by the categorical imperative, which “tells us to act only
on a maxim which we could will to be law” (98) The only problem that freedom entails is
that “the will must have a law, but because the will is free, it must be its own law” (emphasis
added), which Korsgaard claims isn’t an issue because “the categorical imperative merely tells
us to choose a law. The only constraint on our choice is that it has the form of a law. Nothing
determines what that law must be. All that it has to be is a law” (98). This position assumes
that our choice of law is not determined, a common assumption in practical reasoning. While
assumptions can be dangerous things to make, every field must make some, and I don’t find this
one to be a problem. I find that we do have non-determined choice, which I will argue in the
remaining sections of this chapter. Furthermore, as I will show in Chapter 3, the ‘scientific world
view’ may agree with this philosophical premise.

A New Model of Free Will
I propose a two stage model of free will during decision-making that can be understood
both through the lens of neuroscience and practical reasoning. There are two central contentions
in my model: determinism vs indeterminism, and conscious vs unconscious. These do not
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necessarily map onto each other on a one to one basis. In my model, indeterminism is always
a factor. In biological terms, indeterminism constitutes the random variations of neural activity
that create noise. Neural noise is the random fluctuation of electrical signals that pass through a
neural network that can be instigated by the effects of quantum uncertainty. Quantum uncertainty,
which will be explained further in Chapter 3, enables the random variation of position and
velocity of particles that make up chemicals and proteins in our brain. This low level variation
enables slight differences in electrical conductivity of neurons in a circuit. Fluctuations in one
cell can affect the fluctuations in others, which ultimately creates a system of noise. More and
more contemporary studies are showing that neural noise is what enables plasticity, changes to
the way a cell in the brain reacts to stimulation, which underlies learning, memory, and other
adaptations that are vital to life.
That’s indeterminism in the brain. We can think of determinism as a balance for the
random, indeterministic noise in the brain. While cells are capable of fluctuating in specific
properties, other characteristics remain deterministic. For example, neurons fire on an all-ornothing basis. They have a specific threshold of activation that they must receive before an
action potential (more on that in Chapter 3) is initiated, which passed the stimulation signal to
subsequent neurons. The nature of a cell, wherein it follows laws of electrochemical physics,
that follows these strict rules of firing upon reaching the activation threshold, is an example of
determinism. If you know the thresholds and the activation, you can predict the result because it
follows a deterministic pathway.
That was an example of determinism in the brain. These two can take place at higher
levels than just a single cell. Neural noise, indeterminism, can take place at a network level if
cells are active enough to transmit enough signal as to cause fluctuations in subsequent cells,
thereby amplifying variation in network activity. On the other hand, strict patterns of activity,
determinism, can also take place at a network level if the indeterministic fluctuations are not
amplified.
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Thus, we have our mechanisms of indeterminism and determinism, which will be
instantiated and supported in Chapter 3. Now, we must broach the second contention: conscious
vs unconscious involvement in free will. I submit that both have a role, though they may be
unbalanced in terms of quality and quantity of contribution. Consciousness, I propose, can
direct attention in the brain to amplify specific neural noise so as to focus on specific variations
of activity. Through directing attention to specific networks and providing feedback to neurons
within the network telling them to follow specific activity patterns, our conscious attention can
sculpt neural noise into novel neural pathways and activity patterns. What I propose this does is
change the criteria, or rules, that neurons in these networks follow to respond to specific kinds of
stimulation in the future. This can be milliseconds, hours, or even years later.
The unconscious, on the other hand, does not consult higher level cognitive mechanisms,
such as attention, when directing neural activity. When a stimulus is given to an unconscious
framework, the resulting activity obeys deterministic rules that define how the neural network
will respond, what premotor areas it will recruit, and how a response will be precipitated. This
is a fast and easy way to solve simpler problems. Most animals rely entirely on unconscious
responses; they are not confronted by enough complex problems for them to have evolved a
problem-solving capacity through higher level cognitive mechanisms, they simply need to run
when chased, and feed when hungry. Of course, this is not to say that unconscious systems are
simple. They are incredibly complex, mostly because they are in charge of most of our lives.
We are understanding more and more that unconscious systems don’t just control our day to
day breathing, heart beat, the precise motions of my fingers to maneuver a screwdriver, but also
things like judgement through implicit bias.
How do these two contentions map onto each other? Unconscious networks rely entirely
on deterministic neural networks. They do not take the time to consult higher level cognitive
mechanisms and amplify indeterministic neural noise, they just proceed through the path of least
resistance, as in, the simplest, fastest way to dodge the attack of a predator from the bushes, or
a broken limb falling from above. This is not to say there is no indeterminism in unconscious
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activity, only that the indeterminism isn’t amplified, and ultimately doesn’t end up contributing
an appreciable amount to the overall activity. Most determinists who acknowledge the success
of quantum mechanics in describing indeterministic quantum activity in the universe maintain
that such fluctuations occur at such a low level, quantum level particles, as to be subsumed
by the patterns of activity that emerge at a higher level from averaged fluctuations. I hold
that consciousness, on the other hand, applies higher level cognitive mechanisms to amplify
indeterminism in order to sculpt novel network activity patterns and connectivity. But it isn’t
so straightforward. When a conscious mechanism changes a neural network, activity through
that system can progress deterministically such that the changes to cognitive processing map
directly onto changes in how this processing recruits premotor areas, thereby precipitating a new
response that reflects changes in cognitive processing.
This process can also be understood in the more intuitive terms of practical reasoning.
First, we consciously generate a series of motivations (directing attention toward several
variations of neural noise), which are reasons to be or act a certain way. Through deliberation, we
weigh the normative quality of these motivations to ascertain which best fits our practical identity
and which is the most genuinely moving to us. Once we have selected a normative motivation,
this acts as an unbreakable law for us, as we must uphold a law that we hold ourselves to (if we
are genuinely motivated by this reason, then there is no way for us not to uphold it, because we
are rational we must be a law unto ourselves), and we act on the basis of that reason.
So, where does free will fit into this picture? Free will, as I have defined, is the ability to
consciously self-generate a motivation to act. In being able to self-generate motivations, we can
act in a way that is free from predetermination by our environment, upbringing, and biological
makeup. Of course, we can not fly because we will it, and it is true that these factors have a large
and important impact on our deliberations, but we still have the ability to freely generate novel
motivations, which can provide the freedom to choose how to act.
Further, I propose that some unconscious decisions proceed through networks of neural

40
activity and connectivity that have been shaped by our conscious deliberations. As a result,
once conscious deliberations have been made, this establishes what laws we hold ourselves to,
and many unconscious decisions are made using that framework. Let’s say you dig a ditch so
water flows harmlessly alongside the road instead of covering the street in a deep puddle. You
can take credit both for having dug the ditch to make the first trickles of water flow away from
the road, but you can also take credit for the continued function of that system you put in place
a year later. Every once in awhile you may need to fish out a damn of leaves, and thus you can
feel even more instrumental in the continued function of your beautiful ditch. Similarly, if we
decide that we absolutely refuse to harm another individual, and then someone surprises you so
that you unconsciously evade them instead of striking back, you can be proud to have shaped
your unconscious orientation away from violent responses toward a more passive self defense. I
will revisit this idea of the unconscious as an extension of the conscious, and therefore part of the
framework of free will and responsibility, at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 3.
I have four central concerns about those positions that are currently held about free will
coming out of Chapter 1:
1. What is the nature of indeterminism in the brain? What is it and how does it influence
large scale cognitive activities?
2. Can alternative possibilities be obtained through indeterminism? What does it mean
to have been able to do otherwise at a cognitive level?
3. Can we control this indeterminism in a way that does not go through deterministic
pathways, or merely generate random noise?
4. Can our conscious mind control indeterminism in a way that establishes a middle
ground between determinism and randomness?
Next, in the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on three key necessities of my philosophical
position in response to those concerns: the need for alternative possibilities, control over
indeterminism, and that this control be conscious. These are mainly in response to McKenna,
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Kane, and Wegner, respectively. My theory of free will responds to these concerns and thereby
seeks to establish the following requirements for free will, and defend their verity:
1. Alternative possibilities are available through indeterminism.
2. I am the origin of my choices in a way that is neither deterministic nor random.
3. The reasons, or motivations, that guide these choices are generated by my consciousness.
In Chapter 3, when I address the scientific background of my proposal, I will return to the nature
and role of indeterminism in order to flush out the plausibility of my philosophical claim.

Alternative Possibilities
McKenna and Frankfurt’s compatibilist attempts to block the need for alternative
possibilities is convincing; however, I propose that their attempts do not properly account for free
will. As such, their compatibilist position fails to defend free will in the face of determinism. The
failure of Frankfurt’s proposal lies in the fact that it does not allow for alternative possibilities for
an agent’s intention at all. According to this proposal, intentions are the direct and only result of
the series of external stimulations, or experiences, to which the agent has been exposed prior to
decision-making. The external stimuli are not under the control of the agent. The agent merely
encounters them while navigating space. One can argue that the choice of where to navigate
is under the distinct control of the agent, that we choose our environments (e.g. whether we
listen to gypsy jazz or death metal, make friends with athletes or poets, eat nutritiously or not,
etc.). Ostensibly, having this control over the many aspects of our environment would translate
to control over that which stimulates us, and, thus, that which influences our intentions and
therefore our actions.
I agree with this argument, our free willed choice of environment does influence our
development and identity. However, this scenario cannot be supported by a determinist stance.
It assumes that we are always in control of our environment, since birth (or maybe even
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conception) and at every point after. If it is not the case that newborn infants have control over
what they are and are not exposed to, then it cannot be said that their subsequent navigation is
freely willed. If an action corresponds directly to an antecedent environment, then the agent must
have control over their original environment in order to have control over anything. Even given
control over this original decision, determinism implies that all subsequent experience and action
would be the predetermined effects of this original antecedent cause, which would eliminate
control from the hands of the agent the instant after they’ve made their first free willed choice.
Furthermore, if we don’t assume that an agent can have this miraculous moment of free will at
the very beginning of their life, then the predetermining choice is made by, say, the parent. As
such, all subsequent experience and action is the sole cause of the parent, which is the sole cause
of the grandparent, and so on until the origin of the universe.
For any given action, if the agent does not have control over the antecedent
environmental stimuli that precipitates their thoughts and intentions, which it would do in a
deterministic universe, then the agent does not have control over the subsequent action. Further
one cannot hold that an agent has control over the antecedent environment, because the actions
the agent underwent to navigate space into this precise environment were actions that the agent
did not have control over according to the prior argument. The the only way one can assert,
through an avenue without alternative possibilities, that agent has control over their environment
is if you also assert that the origin of this cycle of environment shaping action and action shaping
the environment, the moment of birth, the newborn agent assumes absolute control over their
environment. This is an extremely difficult position to defend, especially given our knowledge
about the environment of the womb influencing development of the child prior to birth. Thus, it
becomes unclear where to draw the line for the moment when an agent becomes an agent and
obtains control over their primary, germinal environment and can thereby be said to have control
over what influences them to intend to act a certain way. This is what is required in order to
defend this compatibilist position
McKenna accounts for this opposition to Frankfurt. He allows that deliberation prior
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to a choice can include non-deterministic alternative possibilities, which breaks this chain of
deterministic cause and effect that removes control from the agent; however, he differentiates
between the period of deliberation and the period of choice-making in order to delineate between
periods when alternative possibilities are needed and when alternative possibilities are not
needed.
It is important to note that I agree in a theory of mental causation wherein our intentions
result in our actions. I hold that our mental considerations directly control our actions, at least
in non-pathological cases. As such, for a non-pathological individual, our intention to act can be
said to determine our actions. The concern I have with Frankfurt relates to the manner in which
our intentions our formed. Given a scenario without alternative possibilities, compatibilism
suggests that our intentions are determined by our environment, which perpetuates the
aforementioned cycle. However, given indeterminism, we can assert that the environment does
not directly determine our intentions. I do not suggest that indeterminism results in a lack of
determinism between our intentions and our actions, much like McKenna, but solely between
our environment and our intentions. I suggest that our brain utilizes indeterminism in such a
way as to create this possibility. Thus, I propose that our free will is our consciousness wielding
our brain as a tool to amplify indeterminism in order to cause the generation of undetermined
intentions, which I call self-generated motivations. By necessity, the self-generation of
motivations requires alternative possibilities, or else there would be nothing undetermined to
generate. As I will discuss further in Chapter 3, indeterminism gives plausible support for such
alternative possibilities.
As we saw in McKenna’s example of Jasper the professor, Jasper was fully capable
of deliberating on the multiple choices he had available such as to accept the money, help the
villagers, or to back away from the situation entirely. However, when it came time for Jasper to
make his decision, a miraculous lesion appeared in his brain that prevented him from making
the choice to help the villagers. McKenna blocked the alternative possibilities that could have
been available to Jasper at the time of decision. If it is the case that Jasper could not have chosen
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otherwise as a result of this lesion, I hold that this was not a freely willed decision. As I have
said, my central objection to McKenna’s proposal lies in his attempt to cleanly differentiate
between a period of deliberation and a period of choice in a temporal dimension. I believe
that this does not account for the complexity of decision-making as it occurs in the brain.
Deliberation is very closely entwined with the actual decision. I would suggest that there was
still the possibility that Jasper could have chosen otherwise than he did, even though it seemed
clear that his intention was to press the bad button. It has been found that deliberation continues
to occur even after the pre-motor areas of the brain are engaged and begin to precipitate the
motor response, which causes an action to be taken. These further deliberations act a as a variety
of regulatory mechanisms.
Given the indeterminism he admits into the model for deliberation, it’s entirely plausible
that, somewhere in the deterministic chain of events that McKenna describes, the insertion of an
indeterminate intention, during or even after the action is being precipitated, could have provided
Jasper with the opportunity to have chosen otherwise. As a result, it could not be assumed that
he would necessarily follow through with pressing the bad button. By blocking this avenue at
what McKenna presumes was a safe time, he actually did prevent Jasper from having control
over which choice he made, which removes free will from the scenario.
This argument relies on disagreeing with how precisely Mckenna blocks Jasper’s
alternative possibilities. Since my model off free will also includes a compatibilistic level of
determinism in the connection between a choice and the action it precipitates, it behooves me to
establish precisely why blocking alternative possibilities with determinism in one way allows for
free will while the other, McKenna’s proposal, does not. I propose that indeterminism is present
during conscious decision-making. I would suggest that during unconscious decision-making
the brain does follow a strictly deterministic pathway, which would accommodate McKenna’s
block of alternative possibilities. If Jasper had made the decision unconsciously in this scenario,
then I would agree that blocking the alternative route (pressing the good button) would not
have made a difference in the causal chain of events and would therefore have not inflicted
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on his authorship of the choice he made. This is a strong proposal that segregates between the
fundamental mechanics of consciousness and unconsciousness. Later, when I address the fourth
concern (i.e. the conscious generation of choice), I will reflect on the nature of the difference
between conscious decision-making and unconscious decision-making, especially as it relates to
the concept of responsibility.
For now however, I propose that the failure of McKenna’s system is in his inaccurate
segregation between the process of deliberation generating a choice, which must be
indeterministic, we both agree, and the process of a choice generating an action, which must
be deterministic, we both agree. He segregates the two according to their temporal qualities.
According to McKenna, if we can just wait until deliberation generates a choice and ceases,
then we can block alternative choices and avoid affecting the deterministic stage of the process.
Since we cannot segregate based on time, we should segregate based on what parts of the
process are conscious. If Jasper was still consciously deliberating even while he pressed the
button, which I expect he would, then it would have been wrong to block alternative possibilities
then. Ultimately, instead of dividing up these processes temporally, like if one occurs, and then
the other in a linear order, we should divide the particular neural pathways involved in either
conscious deliberation or unconscious pre-motor preparation. If we block alternative possibilities
through highly localized lesions in the latter pathways, then I would agree that we have agreed
on a place in decision-making when alternative possibilities can be blocked without disrupting
free will.

Controlling Indeterminism
At this point I will be transitioning into the use of concepts and terminology from the
field of practical reasoning. As an introduction, I refer back to our earlier discussion of volition.
Volition is the capacity to make a choice after consideration and deliberation. This alone does
not seem to describe free will as I define it. It could be argued that the cognitive mechanisms
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of all voluntary deliberation are hardwired by our biological makeup, but if the process of
all ‘voluntary action’ is reduced to neural activity that is pre-defined and out of the control of
our consciousness, then free will, as I define it, does not exist. I suggest that, in order for free
will to stand a chance, we need to have a way of controlling this activity. We must be able to
make a choice about what to do, in a way that is not hardwired, which I translate to mean predetermined. Thus, we must be able to generate a new option, one that was not presented through
a strictly causal network. I will sketch how, in essence, this means generating a new motivation
to act.
The concept of self-generation is central to my theory. Philosophers such as Belageur
and Kane have engaged in conversation about such an idea, which they’ve called torn decisions
or self-forming actions. Philosophers debating this component of free will look for an example
of an instance wherein, given two or more equally compelling options, each with their own
calculated weight and normative value, we can make a choice to go in one direction or another.
Libertarians suggest that this choice can be made nondeterministically, which is to say that given
a set of options an agent can choose one without the decision being determined, or reducible to
a hardwired mechanism. One of the strongest oppositions to this theory of free will, in which
we have control over nondeterministic choices, is that such choices would be based on luck
or chance. One of the largest hurdles that a libertarian perspective must overcome is how an
agent can have control over indeterminism so that it does not manifest as purely random noise.
According to Kane’s definition of free will, with which I agree, an agent must have control
over their decision in a way that is not determined and not random. Thus, free will requires
indeterminism in order to break free of determinism, but also requires that indeterminism yields
to some force possessed by an agent in order for it not to be random or, as Balaguer and Kane
say, in order to have appropriate non-randomness.
In response to these requirements I suggest a theory free will that invokes novelty.
An agent must be inventive; an agent must be capable of being handed multiple choices and
inventing a novel response. But how does novelty come about? Is it possible to merely invent
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something out of thin air? The way that nature arrives that novel events is through random
mixtures, the worst of which are purged through selection pressure and the best of which are
promoted. For example, the evolution the new and improved faculties of an organism come
about through millions of years of genetic variability. Each genetic variant has the opportunity
to test its advantages or disadvantages against the trials of the environment. Through selection
pressure, those genetic variations that result in the greatest advantage survive and reproduce.
Is this how novelty comes about in the brain? Does a brain, in rapid time, generate a series of
random possibilities so that the agent can merely select which one is best? In this way the brain
would be a tool that develops random variations of putative neural activity in response to given
inputs. In order for an agent to have free will, they would then choose which pattern of neural
activity was best, or most appropriate according to the agent’s moral and practical values. A key
question is how an agent can have control over these random neural variations, and thus over
indeterminism, in such a way as to select a “best” option and allow it to precipitate a physical
response in the body.
What I have said so far doesn’t answer this question because the agent can seemingly
only make this choice in a deterministic or random way. It is clear enough to see how an agent
could make this decision through determinism. Given an indeterministic set of putative neural
responses, the agent would merely invoke a series of rules in order to calculate the optimal
choice. Ostensibly, these rules would act like selection pressure driving the most advantageous
output to make the cut and precipitate action. According to a determinist, these rules would start
as instinctive programs hardwired into the brain, and would be honed over time through trial and
error. In making mistakes on some occasions, using some rules, and being successful on others,
using other rules, an agent’s brain would, over time, hone their preferences and beliefs into what
appears to be a very personal and unique approach to every problem.
However, the determinist argues, in actuality a complex computer could perform the
same function given the same predetermined rules at the outset and by following through with
complex calculations and adjustment of rules for these calculations in response to the results.
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This is called a feedback loop when feedback, the success or mistakes of an action, is provided
to the system and the system uses a simple, unwavering, hardwired regulatory program to adjust
the central calculating procedures in order to generate a different, presumably better, response
on the next try. An example of a feedback loop can be seen when kicking a soccer ball. You
intend to hit the ball low to the ground and with a straight, powerful trajectory, but instead it lifts
high in the air and flies over the goal. This represents a mistake in the body’s movement when
kicking, and thus a fault with the calculations the brain made when planning the strike. Seeing
the ball clear the crossbar by 20 feet, the feedback, which tells you that you have to adjust to hit
the ball lower, your brain changes the way in which it calculates the next strike. You retrieve the
ball, and try again, this time with your brain programming the body to lean over the ball more.
You successfully drill the shot straight, low, and with great speed. Observing the success of
your correction, another form of feedback, your brain initiates memory of the new program and,
through repeated practice, will be able to enact the appropriate program in the future.
The vast complexity of this trial and error, which takes place constantly all day every
day, would be the basis for an illusion that an agent’s rules are personal and unique, which would
confirm their basis in free will. However, if we can reduce the seemingly free willed soccer
practice session to a complex feedback loop with prescribed calculations, tolerance levels,
corrections, etc occurring in your brain, then we can also trace the origins of every program that
was used to the inchoate, hardwired programs you were born with, which were modified to the
point they are now by trial and error feedback in the environment. Free will as I define it requires
an additional feature of intention, in which an agent has conscious, meta-regulatory control over
changes in her programming. Otherwise, it is relatively straightforward, though admittedly not
easy, to argue that our perception of ourselves as free willing agents is an illusion.
Therefore, as agents with free will, not only must we be inventive, we must have control
over the rules of the game. Instead of being motivated toward one choice or another by rules
derived from predetermined instincts honed by reducible feedback loops, we must have the
capacity to generate new rules for our mental calculations, which I refer to as new motivations.
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I do not define a new motivation as one which has never been created prior, but rather as
something of which we are the sole origin. Of course, even a free willing agent cannot decide
to pursue a new motivation that defies the laws of physics; we cannot simply fly because we
have the motivation to do so. By novel motivation I do not even suggest that the eventual choice
can be distinguished from what it would have been had we pursued an automatic instinct. The
generation of a novel motivation is merely the amendment of the current rules dictating what
we are motivated to do (how calculations should be made), and why we are motivated to do it
(how these calculations can be applied to present and other decisions). This is to say that the
generation of a novel motivation involves a change in our intentions as well as that which we
find normative so that we may be compelled to take one course of action and not another.
Consider the case of a simple choice that displays the complexity of motivations that can
inspire a seemingly simple decision. One morning you are given the choice of orange juice or
coffee to drink. Most mornings you have coffee, but on this occasion, for whatever reason, you
are confronted with two choices, to maintain your coffee habit, or to try something new. You
could have a range of reasons for performing either action. You may take the coffee because you
have learned from past experiences that coffee wakes you up more. On the other hand, you may
be in the mood to switch things up and try the orange juice. Or you may feel embarrassed, for
whatever reason, to make one choice. Or perhaps there is very little coffee left, so you take the
juice so others can have coffee if they so prefer. Maybe you even know that a certain person will
want coffee, so instead of being impartially altruistic, you’re selectively considering one person.
Maybe this condition is not entirely selfless, but may curry the favor of this person to your
benefit. My point is: the variety of motivations driving any one of the choices is extensive.
While the original components of our motivations can be logically reduced, you will see
that, in the end, we have the ability, when making freely willed decisions, to wield indeterminism
in a way that invents novel variations of those reducible components as a set of options. This
indeterminism breaks the chain of determinism. Suddenly, possibilities enter the picture that
could not have been 100% anticipated, even if we knew everything about the agent leading up to
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this point. It breaks the need for all decisions to be hardwired and predictable (though they may
still end up aligning with what may have been hardwired and predictable). Now we need a way
to control the set of randomized options. I suggest that meta-regulatory elements in our brain,
which is our consciousness at work, choose the motivation that suits us from this pool.
We must be careful to remember that in free will there is a component of determinism.
The precise mechanism of the decision proceeds through a causal mechanism that weighs how
much a choice stands up to requirements for a “good decision.” The choice that is best according
to our requirements, or our principles, is allowed to precipitate action. This is not a facet of free
will that I grudgingly admit to, the determinist argument does not win more ground because I
admit there are components of determinism. I suggest that determinism grants free will more
strength by linking our reasons to our actions. If the process of performing an action based on
a reason was not deterministically causal, there would be no reason to claim we have control
over our reasons, because we wouldn’t be sure that they caused the appropriate action anyway.
Indeed, as Kant writes, the will is a causality, so “freedom is by no means lawless” (65, for
beck). Korsgaard provides some commentary on this subject as well, pointing out both the
causal and the non-causal elements of free will: “Since the will is practical reason, it cannot be
conceived as acting and choosing for no reason. Since reasons are derived from principles, free
will must have a principle. But because the will is free, no law or principle can be imposed upon
it from the outside. Kant concludes that the will must be autonomous: that is, it must have its
own law or principle” (93-94). Thus, I claim that while the calculations themselves are causal,
thereby linking our reasons to our actions, the way in which we calculate is through principles,
what I call rules, that are our own.
Thus, an agent’s consciousness uses meta-level regulatory mechanisms in the brain to
change the rules of the game, to alter why we are compelled one way or another, to alter what it
is that motivates us in that moment as an agent and not as a machine that merely responds in the
way it should given feedback-honed hardwiring. By consciously changing the rules we change
the way our brain calculates weight, and therefore influences the decision-making pathway
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through our free will.

Conscious Control
As I have said, consciousness controls the way our brain calculates the value of things we
consider when making a choice. In other words, our consciousness dictates what motivates us,
and these motivations inform our brain to assign more or less weight to specific considerations
we have in order to sway our decision-making toward the choice that represents our normativity,
or that which compels us. Importantly, I believe that the phenomenology of consciousness, the
experience of it (not the mechanisms themselves but how they feel to us), is vital to this process.
In Chapter 3 I will outline how the phenomenology of an agent’s consciousness has control
over regulatory mechanisms in the brain, which dictates the structure of our decision making,
as well as how current neuroscience supports this claim. Here, I will discuss what it means,
philosophically, for the phenomenology of consciousness to have this control.
One major implication is in distinguishing between conscious and unconscious free will.
If the phenomenology of consciousness is required to control our regulatory mechanisms, then
this would suggest that unconscious decision-making is lacking in free will. The vast majority of
our decisions are unconscious, which means that the vast majority of our actions are generated
unconsciously. This would leave us to suppose that a majority of what we say and do is not the
subject of our free will and therefore not something we are morally responsible for saying or
doing. I propose that many unconscious decisions are based on the motivations that have already
been endorsed by our consciousness. Essentially, our unconscious decisions are an extension of
our conscious ones.
“Trying Not To Try” is a recent book by Edward Slingerland in which he documents the
concept of wu-wei (oo-way) throughout ancient Chinese philosophy, and relates it to findings
in modern cognitive science. Wu-wei is a state of effortless or spontaneous action, which is
complex activity we perform without being entirely aware of it. Some people might experience
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wu-wei when cooking, for example, when you gracefully combine a series of ingredients,
focusing on multiple things cooking at once, and it magically comes together. Perhaps you’re a
gardener and can relate to those moments when you ‘wake up’ and realize you’ve weeded the
whole garden, or a writer and you’re familiar with those times when you ‘wake up’ and find that
it has grown dark outside and ten pages of beautiful prose have leapt out of your fingers. Those
times of thoughtless, effortless activity are called wu-wei. Athletes commonly encounter this
state in the intense moments during a match when they stop over-thinking their actions, allow
their instincts to kick in, and they perform better than normal.
Over-thinking is a key word in this philosophy. Several schools of ancient chinese
thought held that trying too hard, consciously, was counterproductive, and that letting go and
trying not to try, so to speak, was the best way to achieve a state of contentment and productivity.
Slingerland distinguishes between what he calls hot cognition, which is our unconscious mind,
and cold cognition, which is our conscious mind. What is interesting is that wu-wei, a desirable
state wherein we acquire a robust charisma and sense of power, or authority, is achieved through
the submission of our cold cognition, consciousness, to our hot cognition, unconsciousness.
Not only is a majority of our decision-making unconscious, but now submitting to unconscious
decision-making seems to be encouraged! How is free will relevant if the our cold, conscious
cognition is pushed so far on the back burner?
Well, both the ancients and modern cognitive scientists advocate for a period of training
and calibrating. It is widely accepted that we shouldn’t just act on our every instinctual desire. A
couple of the ancient chinese schools of thought (eg Confucianists and some Daoists) believed
that we had to cultivate our hot cognition in some way. Strictly Confucian thought held that
a strict regimen over a long period of time would carve our unconscious mind enough for us
to leave the majority of our activities to spontaneous action. Less conservative Confucianists
following Mencius believed in a more liberal, but definitively cultivating approach, which
involved training and care until we could reach a desirable state. More conservative Daoists led
by Zhuangzi believed in going with the flow, but after having selected a set of values that we
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wish to pursue. What all these philosophies have in common is that they seek to train the hot
cognition to act in a desirable way automatically so that our cold cognition, which is slower and
less efficient, can take the back seat during wu-wei. Equally so, all of these philosophies imply
the need to choose a value-set that we either entrain, or hope to follow. This has to be done by
the cold, conscious mind beforehand.
Part of what this book points out is: if it is the case that our unconscious mind can
handle matters just fine on its own, then why do we have big, bulky, slow, and inefficient
consciousness? This question complements a similar question about why we bothered to evolve a
phenomenological aspect of consciousness if it has no direct causal role in our behaviors. Much
like what we saw with Wegner, one answer is that phenomenological consciousness is a tool that
the brain, not us, not our conscious self, uses to model other minds, and as a metric for how good
or bad an action may be. Slingerland discusses the theories in cognitive science that suggest a
role of consciousness in modelling other minds in a way our unconscious mind cannot:
Our unconscious minds are very good at quickly detecting agency, identifying threats
in our environment, and reading emotions in faces. Only our conscious processes,
however, seem capable of complex modeling of other minds. Consciousness creates
a virtual representation of the internal thoughts of others so that we can figure out
how to interact with them… (59).
Additionally, Slingerland mentions how “the virtual world of consciousness is also where we get
to practice things without actually having to do them… this helps to make the artificial, novel
movements involved more fluent and effective” (59).
Slingerland is not a philosopher of free will, nor does he try to make a statement about
free will, so I will not be critiquing him. Rather, I want to display a fascinating example of
how convergent theory from ancient philosophies to modern cognitive science supports the
heretofore uninvestigated importance of the unconscious mind, but still supports the need for our
consciousness to act as a referee. It is the conscious mind that is making choices with free will
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and modifying the way our unconscious mind approaches decision making. This process, I claim,
is tantamount to our unconscious decisions being freely willed as we have a substantial measure
of control over modifying them to fit our personal moral beliefs.
It could be argued that I am overestimating the impact of consciousness on our day to day
activities. Quite often our intentions seem to elude us, though we still feel that we are responsible
for our actions. Many of us will feel culpable for something we did in the throes of passion, like
yelling at our closest friend because we’re in a bad mood. Why do we still feel responsible?
Because a bad mood shouldn’t have control over us? Because we could have chosen to overcome
that problem and not let it overwhelm us? These rationalizations are based in conscious decisions
we’ve made. We may not explicitly say to ourselves: “I identify as someone who does not allow
my emotions over a problem to hurt people who had nothing to do with said problem, therefore
I think it is wrong to harangue my friends when I am in a bad mood.” Such over-analytical selfawareness is probably just a symptom of being a philosopher, and is not requisite for being a
regular human being.
However, even if we do not have the same terminology and cohesive, rational thought,
of which that quote would be an exemplar, we still go through these logical steps, and I would
say that we do so consciously. At some point prior to yelling at our friend, we have made the
conscious decision that that is something we feel is wrong. Maybe we saw someone in a movie
behave that way and we thought it was wrong. Maybe someone did the same thing to us and
we committed ourselves to never being like that. Deciding that we feel something is right and
something else is wrong, or, more simply, that we like one thing and not another, is entirely
satisfactory for establishing an identity and endorsing requisite values, and regulating our
behavior (conscious and unconscious) through a robust mechanism of free will.
We are still pestered by the findings of cognitive scientists that a majority of our decision
making is unconcious. Some figures rise as high as 99% of our activity being mediated through
unconscious decisions. For one thing, this is slightly misleading as it includes unconscious
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control over such things as heartbeat, breathing, moving our fingers in the precise way it needs
in order to type these words, walking in a straight line while also navigating around that person
who is moving slowly ahead. The amount of neural activity needed to regulate our day to day
activities requires that a great deal of it occur automatically through highly efficient, machinelike processing in our brain. Otherwise, we would be too distracted by menial tasks to be able
to execute long term planning and moral decision making, which probably evolved because
they have an essential, and irreplaceable impact our livelihood (how much others like and will
cooperate with us, how many extra resources we can secure without exerting so much energy,
etc.). For decisions that are morally relevant, or related to our long term goals, a much higher
percentage is conscious. Not all, but much more. And really, this still makes sense as a balanced
structure for conscious and unconscious activity.
Granted the case that only a small percentage of our decisions are conscious, I believe
this still leaves quite a bit of room for what we would consider thorough application of free
will. Let’s say 10% of our decision-making is conscious and therefore capable of being directly
controlled by free will. This is like saying that for every hundred days we spend making
decisions, ten of them are spent figuring out exactly how we want to make these decisions. The
remaining ninety days are spent executing our decisions based on those rules we decided upon.
Ten days is a lot of time to decide what we think is right and wrong. It’s important to distinguish
between deciding what we think is right and wrong in the moment (as a kind of gut reaction, but
one which we consciously endorse), and deciding what we think is right and wrong in the most
optimal sense. People spend their entire lives being philosophers, lawmakers, and policymakers
in order to find the ‘most optimal option’ for what is right and wrong. However, we don’t need a
‘most optimal option’ in order to have an opinion about what is right and wrong. In the moment,
I might think that I am perfectly justified in yelling at my friend simply because I’m in a bad
mood. In that moment I might think that expressing my anger is better than not doing so. Given
enough time I may decide the opposite, that succumbing to that anger only made the problem
worse.
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Thus, we can decide right and wrong, in a way that is entirely mediated by our free will,
rapidly. Even if only 10% of our actions are mediated by those moments when we first decide
how we feel about something (like when we first encounter someone wearing a green suit, or see
a parent pushing their child to get them somewhere they have to be), it becomes clear that the
number of things we endorse as right or wrong during that 10% can certainly account for all our
subsequent actions. It only takes an instant to have a true gut reaction, and probably not much
longer to decide on a temporary moral position. It’s a lot like riding a bike, we spend a couple
weeks learning and then we are able to ride for the rest of our lives. In that sense free will is like
muscle memory; we only need a short period of concentration to master a certain level of skill
that we can continue to execute thoughtlessly for a long time. This doesn’t mean that we will
become internationally renowned cyclists in a couple weeks, or revered fonts of moral wisdom
in ten days. That kind of mastery takes years and years of practice. On the other hand, humans
have an amazing capacity for memory. I suggest that we use this memory to store our conscious
decisions in a way that can be accessed later without necessarily requiring our conscious
endorsement. Indeed, we don’t need our conscious endorsement because we already had it when
we endorsed it in the first place.
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Chapter 3

The Neuroscience of Free Will

So far I have outlined some positions on free will and made my own claim from the
stance of practical reasoning. Here I will show how I find current neuroscience can support my
position. Additionally, I will try to highlight how and why my interpretation of contemporary
scientific theory differs from the central perspective from leading scientists and philosophers,
who most often chock up free will to an illusion.
First, let’s review my position. What does free will mean? Free will is the ability to make
a choice without external influence. A choice is an option for action that we select from a set of
alternatives. The basis of this selection must exist in a decision-making pathway that can exist
on its own, which is to say, without being determined by the events, what I’ve called external
influence, leading up to it. By external influence I mean anything that has happened prior to a
state that has exclusive, causal influence on the eventual result of a choice. Free will does not
rely on such a mechanism. Free will constitutes a choice that is self-generated. A freely willed
decision can never be fully predicted because it has no deterministic analog, which means that
there is no antecedent state that has, according to a defined law of physics, determined the
subsequent existence of the choice state. Free will does not require intrinsic programs that are
hardwired in our brain, otherwise it is determined by a program that relies on antecedent states
that directly, and therefore predictably, cause future states.
Now, the goal of this chapter is to place that proposal into a scientific context. Here’s
one attempt at explaining decision-making. We encounter something, and we receive sensory
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information about it (e.g. the shape, color, smell, movement etc of an object, or of someone’s
face in response to something we say). When we perceive it the sensory information gets
processed in various areas of the brain according to the modality (e.g. touch, taste, smell, sight,
sound) or the valence (i.e. what kind of attention is needed). Processing alerts parts of the brain
that are required to decide how to respond. Several patterns of neural activity, which represent
possible reactions, get some traction and whichever presents with the most support, and therefore
has the highest sway, is selected to precipitate activity in pre-motor areas that are in charge of
designing the response and executing the excitation of relevant motor areas.
This scientific model is the simplistic “sense-think-act” cycle that is the groundwork of
the roboticist perspective. Roboticists are the eliminitive incompatibilists of the lab. In his book,
“Mental Biology: A New Science of How the Mind and Brain Relate,” lifelong neuroscientist
W.R. Klemm defines roboticists as those scientists and philosophers whose position “requires
the assumption that humans are biologically programmed robots… that our brains have been
programmed by our genetic endowment and by past experience–thus, the conclusion follows that
we are biological robots” (172-173). In essence, the roboticist belief is that (a) the activities of
the brain are reducible to matter that makes it up (cells, subcellular organelles, molecules, and
all the way down to the particle physics of atoms), and (b) that the structure and function of the
matter in our brain, at all levels, is reducible to hardwired mechanisms and direct stimulation
from the outside world. While a roboticist might accept that there is a degree of uncertainty, or
indeterminism, when you get down to the quantum level, they would suggest that this would
only modify their claim if it turned out that activity in the brain is thereby random. Nonetheless,
whether determined or random, choice would still be outside the grip of anything like free will.
Before moving forward, I should take some time to discuss the physics of indeterminism
at the quantum level. What do I mean when I use the term quantum uncertainty? Such phrases
like “quantum uncertainty”, or “Heisenberg’s principle” may strike fear in our hearts, but it is
not necessary to understand the complexity of the topic in full. I will endeavor to summarize the
relevant material so that we can understand quantum indeterminism, and how it plays a role in
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the capacity for free will. In 1927, German physicist Werner Heisenberg introduced his principle
of quantum uncertainty, which suggested that the more we know about one quality of a particle,
such as its location in space, the less we can know about other qualities of that particle, such as
its momentum. This is to say that there is ultimately a limit to what we can know about a particle.
Imagine you’re watching a film at the theater but the screen is very dim so that you can barely
make out what’s happening. The attendant tries to correct the error, and successfully brightens
the image, but simultaneously, the sound dies out so we can’t understand what’s being said, even
if we can see people talking. This helps us to understand the way in which quantum states are
measurable. One question we may ask, however, is whether this limit is epistemological, bound
by insufficient technology, or ontological, an intrinsic fact of nature?
Originally, Heisenberg attributed some uncertainty to what’s called the “measurementdisturbance relationship” wherein the act of measuring a particle changed the quantum state. As
such, we can not ascertain the precise state of a particle. Some recent studies have been finding
that the measurement-disturbance relationship doesn’t account for as much uncertainty as was
previously thought (Rozema et al., 2012). However, the team still notes that “in the end, there’s
no way you can know [both quantum states] accurately at the same time,” which supports the
fundamental aspect of the principle of quantum uncertainty, which purports to describe an
intrinsic aspect of nature that cannot be known.
Why can’t it be known? The reason for this is that these qualities of a particle are
seemingly indeterministic. They follow no definable laws of deterministic physics that we know.
They behave randomly. There are clouds of probability wherein a particle may reside, or ranges
of momentum the particle may have, but where precisely in the cloud or in the range the particle
may be is a matter of chance. Thus, quantum uncertainty, uncertainty about the quantum state of
a particle, renders physical systems indeterminate, at least at a small scale. Given the success of
quantum mechanics in displaying this indeterminate nature of particle physics, we are confronted
by two problems for free will. First, how can this indeterminacy have an effect on such a large,
complex system as the brain without being entirely superseded? How could quantum states really
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have a meaningful effect on atomic structure and activity, let alone molecules, cells, circuits, and
networks that eventually conglomerate into a single brain? Second, even if there were a way in
which quantum uncertainty could translate on a larger scale to the brain, how can we exert free
will in a way that controls randomness, but isn’t determined? In other words, how can there be
a middle ground between random, uncontrollable indeterminism, and pre-ordained, predictable
determinism?
These questions will take some time to even begin to answer here, not to mention the
time it will take for us to really develop sufficient empirical (or even theoretical) support for a
middle ground. In this chapter I seek to support the plausibility of this middle ground given our
current understanding of physics and neuroscience, and how science and philosophy can team up
to explore these avenues moving forward. To be clear, I am not attempting to prove the existence
of free will with our current evidence. Instead I am supporting the idea that it is an open scientific
and philosophical question, that it has not been disproven, and that it is plausible that we may
find an explanation in the direction of a middle ground between indeterminism and determinism
For now, let us endeavor to answer these questions by returning to the “sense-think-act”
cycle. Philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark, in “Mindware: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Cognitive Science”, writes that this cycle is supported by roboticists who suggest
that there is “a simple division of labor in which perceptual processing yields a rich, detailed
inner representation of the 3D visual scene, which is then given as input to the reasoning and
planning centers, which in turn calculate a course of action and send commands to the motor
effectors” (88). In this cycle we see the kind of distinction between deliberation and the decision
that was assumed by McKenna’s thought experiment.
It has become clear that this simplification is not true in many ways, a couple of which
relate to problems with McKenna’s model of the decision-making pathway. According to the
roboticist model, and according to what McKenna implies to be a model for cognition, there is
a period of deliberation and then a final, cumulative decision, which then initiates action. More
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recent findings suggest that this cycle ignores the interactive quality of this cycle wherein, as
Clark summarizes:
1. Daily agent-environment interactions seem not to depend on the construction and use
of detailed inner models of the full 3D scene.
2. Low-level perception may “call” motor routines that yield better perceptual input and
hence improve information pick-up.
3. Real-world actions may sometimes play an important role in the computational process
itself.
4. The internal representation of worldly events and structures may be less like a passive
data structure or description and more like a direct recipe for action (88).
As such, what Clark calls a “compelling hypothesis” is the new model which suggests that “the
visual system is not even attempting to build a rich, detailed model of the current scene, but is
instead geared to using frequent saccades to retrieve information as and when it is needed for
some specific problem-solving purpose” (91). All of this means that decision-making is not
really a straightforward cycle. It can be more accurately described as an interactive system that
monitors its progress, adjusts to specific demands, and always regulates the computations it
performs, even after the “decision” is made by processing centers.
What does this mean for my philosophical claims? This suggests that I was right to
question the conclusions McKenna draws based on his thought experiment. The act of decision
making is too complex for us to be able to say that the lesion in Jasper’s brain played no role in
his final decision, perhaps he could have done otherwise. It isn’t possible to defend Frankfurt’s
objection to alternative possibilities by selectively limiting alternative possibilities at the
“moment of decision” instead of for all deliberation, because decision-making and deliberation
are intertwined, and may even be identical processes for some decisions, as Clark’s point number
four above addressed. The remaining features of the interactive hypothesis clearly establishes
the complexity of the decision-making process. Now, such a complex process, with numerous
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variables that need to be controlled constantly, comprehensively, and with some degree of
consistency, needs to be under control. Much like businesses, governments, or individual tasks,
the bigger, or the more complex our decision-making process becomes, the more need there is
for a meta-regulatory network to oversee the completion of deliberation and choice. This opens
the door for conscious intervention on the whole causal pathway of decision-making.
Many books on the topic of consciousness are at some point confronted by the same
question: if phenomenological consciousness plays no role in the causal pathway of decision
making, then what on earth is it for? We know that consciousness is clunky, time-consuming,
and inefficient in comparison to the unconsciousness. This is why so much of our lives is run
by unconscious elements of our brain; if we had to keep track of every heartbeat, every breath,
every step, every movement of our mouth to articulate a word, so on, we would be incredibly
overwhelmed. We wouldn’t be able to handle it, and there would be no time for sports, or love, or
philosophy. Why, then, would we have evolved to have such a rich phenomenological experience
if it did not impact our decision making in some way? Why, when our unconscious mind seems
fully capable of controlling all aspects of our basic life, as recent research is showing, do we
have this inefficient, and ultimately inconsequential experience?
“A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness” is V. S. Ramachandran’s analysis on the topic
of the mind, both conscious and unconscious. In his exploration of Libet’s experiments, which
we have discussed earlier (where it was found that the feeling of willing something occurs
after the initiation of relevant activities in the brain), Ramachandran is confronted by this why
question: “Why might this be happening? What might the evolutionary rationale be? … If the
subjective sensation of willing is like a shadow that accompanies us as we move but is not causal
in making us move, then why would evolution bother delaying the signal so that it coincides
with our movement?” (88-89). He suggests that the delay of conscious experience from the
initiation of relevant brain activity may have developed so that the sensation of willing an action
would “coincide not with the onset of the brain commands but with the actual execution of the
command by your finger” (88).
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From a cognitive science perspective, this makes sense as there needs to be consistent,
temporal contingency between two events in order for humans to suspect that they are causally
related. As we saw with Wegner’s tree branch example, if a tree branch moves exactly as we
imagine, at the same time as we imagine it will move, and does so consistently, then, and almost
only then, is it relatively easy to think that we caused it to move. Likewise, if our feeling of
willing our action was not temporally proximal to the action itself, then perhaps we wouldn’t feel
so strongly that we had willed it. Imagine if we thought about moving our finger, and it happens
almost a full second later. Imagine now that all our actions come with this delay, while we might
get used to it, it may not convince us that there is an unimpeachable causal link.
It could be argued that that this means nothing about whether or not this feeling of willing
is causal. It’s just something our brain makes us experience in order to, perhaps, inform future
decisions that the brain makes for us. The same can be said in the other direction: if it’s just
a matter of our brain trying to give us the experience of willing, then it stands to reason that,
instead of delaying the signal to the time of action, the brain could have evolved a different
capacity for the feeling of contingency such that we would still have the sensation of willing
even if the awareness occurred without delay, well before the action. In other words, why come
up with the contraption of delayed experience instead of more liberal contingency? Would a
more liberal sense of contingency alter our feeling of control over events in our environment? It’s
possible, but if the contingency were to be a small range at the exact time when action occurs,
then it’s unlikely any environmental event would consistently fall within that range.
Ramachandran identifies a paradox in Libet’s findings, which stems from our intuitive
understanding of causation:
On the one hand, the experiment shows that free will is illusory: it cannot be causing
the brain events because the events kick in a second earlier. But on the other hand,
the delay must have some function, otherwise why would the delay have evolved?
Yet if it does have a function, what could it be other than moving (in this case) the
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finger? (89)
He notes the intuitive conclusion from Libet’s experiments (that free will is an illusion), but also
points out that there must be a functional purpose in the precise delay of the feeling of willing.
It had to occur closer to the event to be contingent, but not too close, otherwise we wouldn’t
draw the intuitive conclusion that our will must have caused the action because that which
comes first would cause the latter event. He concludes that “perhaps our very notion of causation
requires a radical revision… as happened in quantum mechanics” (89), which strongly supports
the direction that my philosophical claim has taken, suggesting that a specific amplification of
quantum uncertainty introduces a non-deterministic quality to decision making, which could
solve this paradox.
It may seem like the only solution is to find a way that the universe can function wherein
events can cause their antecedent events (B can cause A even though it occurs later temporally).
This sounds like a demand for a time traveling solution; event B must be able to inflict causation
backwards in time, or something crazy like that. Now, it may be the case that time is not linear,
that causation may have a completely different temporal profile than we expect, but this is not the
necessary revision to our notion of causation that is required to solve this paradox.
In his attempt at a solution, Ramachandran connects matter in the brain to qualia, or
phenomenological experiences like “the redness of red, the flavor of Marmite or paneer tikka
masala or wine” (96). To start off, he says that qualia “must have evolved to fulfill a specific
biological function–they cannot be mere by-products (an “epiphenomenon”) of neural activity”
(98). But what is the biological relevance, and how does it support the notion of free will?
Ramachandran writes that:
Sensory representations that are themselves devoid of qualia might acquire qualia in
the process of being economically encoded or “prepared” into manageable chunks
as they are delivered to a central executive structure higher up in the brain. The
result is a higher order representation that serves new computational goals (98-99).
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To some extent it can be argued that the biological purpose might just be to create an experience
as a tool to better compute a decision. The idea that the brain is creating this sensation for itself
to feel, instead of us, as agents, experiencing it, seems to degrade any chance at reserving free
will, but some philosophers have found ways to argue from this structure that Ramachandran
describes that there is free will.
This brings us to Dennett’s narrative consciousness philosophy, which is supported
and excellently described by Andy Clark. He writes that Dennett’s idea is that “a system has
a belief just in case its behavior is well predicted by treating it as a behavior” (178), which is
called the “Intentional Stance” of consciousness. The brain is considered “the locus of multiple,
quasi-independent processing streams. There is no single, ultimate judgement issued by the
brain in response to an input–no decisive moment in space or time where the system settles on a
unique definitive content fixing the conscious state” (178). As such, Dennett writes in his book
“Consciousness Explained” that consciousness is a constant narrative that is “not anything we
are born with, not part of our innate hard-writing, but in surprisingly large measure, an artifact of
our immersion in human culture” (346). This organization allows us to make “cognitive objects
of our own thought processes and to weave a kind of on-going narrative (about who we are,
and what we are doing, and why we are doing it) that artificially “fixes” the cognitive contents”
(Clark, 179).
Personally, I don’t know how to feel reassured by this philosophy of self, and of free will
as a sensation requisite of this narrative self. This concept is asserting that all our experiences
of agency, of beliefs, of self, are complex narratives that our brain conjures for us. Imperatively,
the “for us” is not ‘us’, as in our phenomenological experience of ourselves, but ‘us’ as in our
brain. This illusionary narrative is not generated for the benefit of some small, weak agent to
watch like a movie, the agent is the movie that the brain is watching, presumably as a monitor to
better inform itself about how to proceed in its day to day activities of determining everything
our bodies do and everything we will feel subsequently. This makes experience feel like a tool
for our brain to monitor its progress, which disagrees with my definition of free will. While
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the narrative is self-generated, Dennett’s claim is that the self is our unconscious body, which,
without a causal conscious influence, can only be shaped by the factors outside of our control. In
the next chapter I will provide evidence that this is not true.
Returning to Ramachandran, he continues to describe this structure of consciousness, but
takes a slightly different approach. Recall that he has established the existence of “a higher order
representation that serves new computational goals.” He expands on this representation and says:
Let us call this second, higher-order, representation a meta-representation… One
could think of this meta-representation as a second “parasitic” brain–or at least a set
of processes–that has evolved in us humans to create a more economical description
of the rather more automatic processes that are being carried out in the first brain.
Ironically, this idea implies that the so-called homunculus fallacy–the notion of a
“little man in the brain watching a movie screen filled with qualia”– isn’t really a
fallacy (99).
So far, he seems to be describing a similar scenario of a brain that creates a movie-like narrative
for another part of the brain to watch. However, Ramachandran elaborates on the concept of
the homunculus in a way that suggests not that it is generated by meta-regulatory activity, but
that the homunculus generates the activity itself, or at least that they are one and the same.
As he writes: “I suggest that the homunculus is simply either the metarepresentation itself, or
another brain structure that emerged later in evolution for creating meta-representations… it
doesn’t have to be a single new structure–it could be a set of novel functions that involves a
distributed network,” which then “serves to emphasize or highlight certain aspects of the first
[representation] in order to create tokens that facilitate novel styles of subsequent computations,
either for internally juggling symbols sequentially (“thought”) or for communicating ideas to
others through a one-dimensional sound stream (“language”)” (99-100).
This direction of thought takes us closer to what I conceive to be a new model of
cognition that supports the existence of free will. I proposed in Chapter 2 that we are capable
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of self-generating motivation. What I meant by that is that free willing agents are capable of
altering events in their brains in order to favor one set of calculations over another, and thus to
favor one decision over another. The change of calculations is a change in motivations. In terms
of practical reasoning, we generate new motivations by creating new reasons to act one way and
not another. In order to achieve this we select a new way of calculating what decision to make.
The action of calculating, in brief, consists of neurons firing and activating each other in a pattern
that initiates later activity, which eventually will result in activity in motor areas that stimulate
bodily responses. This mechanism proceeds deterministically, otherwise there would be a disjoint
between what decisions cause which actions, and this would be biologically disastrous.
However, the question of free will arises earlier. In Chapter 2, I proposed that free will
is the ability to change which parameters are important for these calculation; free will is the
ability to change the rules, and it must proceed on a middle ground between determinism and
indeterminism. For more scientific support of this claim, I will turn first to Peter Tse for a view
of free will at the level of the synapse, the communicative connections between neurons, then I
will refer back to Klemm for a view of free will at the level of meta-regulation, which will bring
together the effects at the small level of the synapse to display how consciousness exerts brainwide control over neural events, thereby exercising free will over choices and actions.

Synaptic Free Will
“The Neural Basis of Free Will” is Dartmouth professor of cognitive neuroscience
Peter Tse’s unprecedented attempt to answer the free will question by looking at the activities
of individual and small groups of neurons. Through careful analysis of the physics, chemistry,
physiology, molecular biology and computational aspects of the brain, he finds that a strong free
will, much like I have defined, is not only plausible, but empirically verifiable. In the following
section I will distill the many components of his argument to a concise explanation of how
indeterminism enables free will. I will also attempt to convince the reader that this scientific
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proposal supports precisely my philosophic claim that free will constitutes self-generated
motivation.
Tse argues that his philosophy of free will applies regardless of whether we accept or
deny indeterminism. However, he generally assumes that the universe has been found to be at
least sufficiently indeterministic for a “strong free will” to exist, because it supports the fact that
“things really could have turned out otherwise” (2.1). As we have seen, there has been some
confusion about whether observed indeterminism was an issue with our method of measurement
or an ontological reality. As Tse points out, “determinists are loath to give up the idea that
unmeasured properties nonetheless occupy a definite state at each moment,” (A1.6) which is to
say that determinists support the idea that unmeasured quantum states of a particle still exist in
a set form, they are just inaccessible. Imagine you’ve walked into a dark room without lights.
You use a flashlight to determine first the location of one wall, and then the wall opposite to it.
You can’t see both clearly at the same time. The determinists argue that, regardless of which
wall you’re looking at, the other exists in a set location. Of course, this is the most intuitive
understanding of the universe, but indeterminism suggests that at the quantum level, the precise
qualities of quantum states, like the nature and location of the opposite wall, are not set, they do
not “occupy a definite state at each moment”.
Tse also writes that many determinists have tried to suggest a variety of complex
alternatives to quantum indeterminism, but ultimately “there is no need to invoke quantum
nonlocality, superposition, entanglement, coherence, tunneling, quantum gravity, or any new
forces to understand informational causal chains in the brain” (A1.8). He writes that some of
these theories are inapplicable because they require circumstances that are physiologically
irrelevant (“the brain is, simply put, too “warm” to support this kind of quantum-domain
coherence, and synapses are too wide to support electron tunneling”), whereas the rest
are improbable in comparison to quantum indeterminism (“I doubt that quantum-domain
effects— beyond the variability in neural dynamics introduced by amplification of microscopic
fluctuations—are required to account for how information is processed by neurons”).
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He is careful to note that while indeterminism introduces a kind of gap in the causal
chain, as Kane has suggested, free will doesn’t require that consciousness “play a necessary
role in determining which possibility is actualized,” which may sometimes seem unlikely, but
rather that “consciousness, and the entertainment of possible scenarios and courses of action in
working memory, plays a role in changing the criteria for firing on neurons that might lead to
future mental events” (A1.9, emphasis added). This classification of free will supports what we
have already discussed wherein consciousness changes the rules of the game in order to influence
decision-making.
Having established the premise of indeterminism, Tse goes on to acknowledge the
apparent problem of mental causation. The question is how mental events can change the
physical substrate that encodes that mental event. “Higher-level facts in the present are realized
in physical facts in the present. In this regard, any information that is realized in neurons that are
active now cannot change the physical basis of that information itself. That would be impossible
circular causation” (2.3). Thus, we know that mental events arise from coded information in
neuronal activity, but how can you reverse the direction of causation such that the mental event
influences the activity that created it? Tse writes that we don’t need to reverse the direction:
Neurons do not only make other neurons fire; they also recode the informational
criteria realized in the physical criteria that will make other neurons fire at some
unknown time in the future when the right inputs come along. The central thesis
argued here is that physically realized mental events can change the physical
basis not of present but rather of future mental events by triggering changes in the
physical and informational criteria that must be met by future presynaptic inputs
before future postsynaptic neuronal firing occurs (2.3).
This is a lot to digest, but if we pick apart the terminology the central thesis becomes clear. First
we will look at how a neuron works, in brief, and then his philosophy of criterial causation, then
we will pick apart the neuroscience to understand how criterial causation is involved in neural
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events on a cell to cell level.
Neurons are cells in the brain that conduct charged ions (e.g. Na+, K+, Cl-, Ca2+) across
its membrane through ion channels. Cascades of moving ions, such as rapid influx of Na+,
result in flow of electrical current and changes in membrane voltage, which is the difference in
electrical potential between the outside and the inside of the cell. These changes can culminate in
a hyperpolarized (less excited) state, where the difference in potential between the inside and the
outside of the cell is large, or in a depolarized (excited) state, where the difference is minimized.
During depolarization, the resting membrane potential rises rapidly until it reaches the reversal
potential for Na+, and then reverts to a more hyperpolarized state before finally rising to the
stable resting potential. These changes constitute the rapid influx of Na+ (rising potential)
followed by rapid efflux (lowering potential), and the slower influx of K+ (the stabilizing increase
to resting potential).
This spike in potential is called an action potential. It arises at the axon hilloc, between
the base of the axon and the body of the cell, and is transferred by a chain reaction through the
axon to the axon terminals. The terminal ends of the axon connect with the dendrites, receptive
branches, of another cell, forming what’s called a synapse. When the action potential reaches the
terminal it signals the release of neurotransmitters into the synapse between pre and postsynaptic
neurons. The neurotransmitters initiate ion flow through ion channels in the postsynaptic neuron,
which sends signals from the dendrite to the cell body, where the information is processed. If
input to the cell from the synapses meets a threshold, it initiates an action potential that repeats
the cycle to stimulate the next cell in a neural circuit.
Criterial causation relates to physical and informational criteria for this neuronal firing.
In order for a neuron to respond to stimulation in a certain way (i.e. with a spike, or two, or
not), the stimulation it receives must meet some physical criteria (such as exceeding a threshold
electrical potential before the cell fires from the axon hilloc) or informational criteria (such as
what information is mentally realized when the cell is fired). There are two forms of plasticity,
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synaptic and intrinsic plasticity, that control how much stimulation a postsynaptic cell is capable
of receiving from a presynaptic neuron, and how a cell’s intrinsic properties integrates synaptic
input and produces output activity.
Now let’s discuss how criterial causation can fit into a model of neural events. Tse
suggests a three stage model for criterial causation:
(1) New physical/informational criteria are set in a neuronal circuit on the basis
of preceding physical/mental processing at time t1, in part via a mechanism of
rapid synaptic resetting that effectively changes the inputs to a postsynaptic neuron.
These changes can be driven either volitionally or nonvolitionally, depending on
the neural circuitry involved.
(2) At time t2, inherently variable inputs arrive at the postsynaptic neuron,
and (3) at time t3 physical/informational criteria are met or not met, leading to
postsynaptic neural firing or not (2.7).
What Tse is suggesting is that, after a neuron participates in the creation of a mental event
it adjusts its synaptic and intrinsic criteria for when and how it will respond to future neural
stimulation events. He doesn’t explicitly refer to intrinsic criterial adjustments because research
into intrinsic plasticity is less complete, but there is sufficient evidence to show that intrinsic
plasticity fits right in this model. These adjustments can be mediated by volition, or conscious
will, or not. After making adjustments, a cell will inevitably receive new stimulation. Depending
on whether the new criteria are met, the cell will respond a certain way, maybe it will fire,
maybe not. Tse argues that indeterminism can be involved in the first two stages, but not the last,
because “intracellular potential either passes the threshold for firing or it does not” (2.7). Tse’s
model parallels the model I have established as it also defines a period of indeterminacy and the
stages after which indeterminism is irrelevant and events occur on a deterministic basis.
Now we have the foundation needed to understand Tse’s central thesis: “physically
realized mental events can change the physical basis not of present but rather of future mental
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events by triggering changes in the physical and informational criteria that must be met by future
presynaptic inputs before future postsynaptic neuronal firing occurs”. In other words, after a
mental event of any magnitude occurs, there is a way for regulatory activity to relay information
back to the neurons from the mental event originated, and in so doing can influence the
postsynaptic cell’s criteria for responsiveness to future stimulation by presynaptic events. This
carefully sidesteps the problem of mental causation, which states that a mental event arising from
physical substrate cannot modify itself by modifying the physical substrate. But Tse notes that
his model certainly describes free will because while “there can obviously never be a self-caused
event… criteria can be set up in advance, such that when they are met, an action automatically
follows; this is an action that we will have willed to take place by virtue of having set up those
particular criteria in advance” (7.5).
A remaining question is how a mental event can influence the change of a neuron’s
physical and informational criteria. Tse holds that, “assuming amplification of microscopic
fluctuations, criterial causation permits downward mental causation and a strong free will
because neurons can set up criteria for future action potential release that, once satisfied, lead to
nondetermined yet self-selected future actions” (2.6). We will discuss amplification further when
we discuss Klemm, but the point here is how this downward mental causation presents itself. The
questions that remain are: what is the precise nature of this changing criteria, and how do some
mental events cause that change in a way that instills free will in the system?
First, the nature of neuronal criterial changes. We need not dive too far into the details
of complex mechanistic criterial changes, a topic that Tse describes in thorough detail in his
book (Chapter 5), as it is complex, and not yet fully understood. The strength of the proposal is
understood well enough by understanding the following, which is only one example of a type of
neural plasticity that can be involved in criterial causation.
There are a subset of receptors that are located in the membrane of a neuron at the
synapse called NMDA receptors. NMDA receptors belong to a family of receptors called
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ionotropic receptors, which are made up of several subunit proteins. These typically four
subunits line up like a bouquet of proteins with a space between them through which ions can
pass, like through a channel. In the case of NMDA, the proteins are signalled to open the channel
when the neurotransmitter glutamate and the amino acid glycine bind to the surface, and when
the neuron in question is currently depolarizing (being excited, or spiking). When open, the
channel permits Na+ and Ca2+ to permeate the membrane, enter the cell and further depolarize
the membrane as well as regulate a variety of features, such as the neurotransmitter release
subsequent to the cell spiking.
Tse proposes that NMDA receptors can influence future spiking events because they
control the precise timing and strength of synaptic input, which mediates spike-timing dependent
plasticity. Spike-timing dependent plasticity refers to how the activity and informational coding
of a cell will change depending on how it spikes in the wider context of the cells around it and
the timing of the introduction of a stimulus. If a spike occurs after an upstream event, it fits in
the causal cycle (wherein an object responds to something that came before it) and cooperates
with other cells to contribute to the larger response. On the other hand, if the spike time is
before an upstream event, then it doesn’t fit in the picture and is considered to be unrelated to
the phenomenon, and therefore only a competitor for attention, not a contributor. Imagine the
scenario of a basketball game: if someone in the crowd cheers before a shot is taken, they would
appear out of place, and wouldn’t contribute to a group response. It might appear that they are
cheering for some other purpose, like the pass preceding the shot, or an email they just received
telling them they’ve been accepted into a competitive graduate program. If they cheered just after
a shot, like is normal, then they appear much more coherent with the rest of the crowd.
While this wouldn’t happen in the same way with humans, of course, plasticity among
neurons, the ability to change connections and individual activity, would result in the exclusion
and inhibition of cells that spiked before the stimulus, whereas those that spiked together and at
the “right time” would be welcomed as contributors to a pattern of response. This would shape
the way cells and the brain as a whole respond moving forward. As Tse writes:
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Over time, such spike timing-dependent weight changes could result in the
“sculpting” of neural circuits, in which spikes, and the information realized in them,
are causal of later spikes and information, from level to level in an informationprocessing series of stages. Such circuitry allows the encoding and learning of
information about external causation in terms of changes in synaptic weights and
the ordering of neuronal firing in a network (5.11).
Relating this back to NMDA receptors, Tse suggests that changes in NMDA receptors can
reweight the interactions between pre and postsynaptic neurons in such a way as to sculpt
neuronal circuits to respond to future events (which can be events one second in the future or
years later) in a way that can be mandated by top down mental causation (free will) and not just
by deterministic responses of a cell to stimulation.
Since NMDA receptors “can play a role in physically realizing so many of the most
fundamental properties of information processing in neuronal circuits” (5.25) yet be altered by
such small atomic events, they effectively amplify quantum level uncertainty to indeterminism
at the level of the cell. This ability enables NMDA receptors to be a basis for the indeterminism
that is wielded by higher level processing to produce creative optimization heuristics when
deliberating. More on that later. Tse writes conclusively that:
NMDA receptors may play at least four important roles in the neuronal basis of
mental causation: (1) they introduce randomness to the macroscopic domain in
the form of spike-timing uncertainty, which may then meet or not meet present
neuronal criteria; (2) they may play some role in an “annealing” process that
minimizes the chances of getting stuck in local minima of thought or behavior,
affording the generation of many possible solutions that can meet a set of criteria;
(3) they may realize rapid synaptic resetting that permits neurons to escape the
impossibility of self-causation by changing the criteria for firing of neurons on the
next information-processing cycle; and (4) they transition neural network behavior
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into a bursting mode that allows for the transfer of bursts as informational packets
across a network, which, I argue, is the neural basis of attentional binding (5.51).
For now we will focus in on roles 3 and 4, and how they demonstrate a capacity for the brain to
reweight synaptic responsiveness in a way that controls future output. We will go back to roles
1 and 2 when discussing how indeterminism initiates a process of creative problem solving in
order to arrive at potentially novel choices in the face of alternative possibilities.
Tse writes that changes in NMDA receptors can be initiated by back-propagating action
potentials, which send the signal to dendritic receptors to change. The back-propagation of action
potentials can be “altered by network inputs that sculpt which branches are ‘active’” and they
“could be a graded or gain-modulated process that effectively [adds] or [decreases] resistance
to the passage of an action potential up particular dendritic branches” (5.26). Thus, “network
inputs” would have control over which and how dendritic branches are able to undergo synaptic
reweighting. Tse proposes that network inputs could be the encoded information delivered by
bursting activity (repeated neuronal firing) that is optimized in working memory and mediated by
endogenous attention.
Endogenous attention and working memory are the core components of Tse’s model
for top-down mental causation. For Tse, we are able to generate ideas in working memory that
are simulations of action and repercussion in order to deliberate on the solution to a problem.
Endogenous attention allows for the manipulation of the contents in working memory, to either
select (enhance) or deselect (attenuate) specific options. Arriving at optimized solutions we
can then direct lower level cognitive mechanisms that will provide input to specific groups of
neurons that will undergo synaptic reweighting to accommodate the intent of upper level mental
events and thereby sculpt the circuits and networks of our brain into what we choose to be. What
gives us the choice, what makes this a model for conscious free will, is the fact that these highest
levels of cognitive processing require consciousness and phenomenology to operate.
Consciousness acts as a unifying model for decision-making, much in the same way as
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Ramachandran considers it a homunculus for the self. Consciousness is a single framework,
inside of which our decision-making can operate. This answers the question about why we
have consciousness, why we have phenomenological experience, and why we experience
qualia. These are all causal mechanisms, they are all necessary and requisite to higher level
processing, which in turn controls future cellular responsiveness to stimuli. Qualia, Tse writes
provide “a common, endogenously attendable format [which] is required so that the outputs
of different subsystems can be evaluated along a common metric, by a common set of criteria
assessing input, which, if satisfied, releases a decision to act” (10.24). In other words, in order
for the complexity of the brain to be cohesive and efficient, all levels of processing need to
communicate in the same language, which is what Tse proposes is the goal of qualia, or the ways
that we experience things, like the indescribable sensation of the color red.
Higher level processing relies on ideational information in the form of representations,
which are what we generally think of as thoughts: mental images of basketball games, mental
simulations of our actions, the abstract concepts that are debated in a philosophy class.
These representations, are built from the cumulative experience of qualia for in one subject,
like the combination of sensations during a basketball game. Pivotally, the highest levels of
processing, for Tse, require consciousness to function, thereby suggesting a role for conscious,
phenomenal experience, in the causal mechanisms of our brain. Further, Tse notes that the
qualia we experience aren’t simply an uncontrollable stream of processing in lower level
unconscious mechanism; he suggests that the contents of experience “can be changed through
the manipulations of numerous cognitive operations, such as mental rotation or volitional shifts
of attention” (10.48).
By way of concluding the discussion of Tse’s many-sided model of free will, I will first
allow him to tie it all together:
Certain operations can only take place over conscious operands, and thoughts and
motor acts can follow and build upon or enact the conclusions of such operations,
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such operations over conscious operands can be causal of subsequent thoughts
and motor acts. Such mental operations within the domain of experience play a
necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) causal role in their mental and motoric
consequences and are not mere illusions of volition... It is the deliberative and
volitional manipulation of contents of working memory via endogenous attentional
operations that offers the primary causal role of consciousness and the primary
domain of free will, regardless of whether or not such operations are associated
with conscious feelings of willing or agency. Free will is not limited to the kinds
of decisions that are reached by tracking or playing things out endogenously in
working memory. Free will also includes the creative ability to imagine, regardless
of whether any physical act follows from that which has been imagined (10.85).
For Tse, our self is a real and true self. Each of us is a self that is identical with the substrate
of our brain, obeying functionalism, but that is capable of engaging in conscious, bottom up
indeterministic thought in working memory and that uses attention as top down control over
lower level cognitive mechanisms that instigate synaptic reweighting. This reweighting forces
cells to respond differently to future events in a way that is mandated by conscious free will.
It is important to recall, before we leave Tse, that his example of NMDA receptors is
just one example. There are many more receptors and non-receptor factors involved in synaptic
reweighting. Furthermore, there is a whole field of ion channels and associated factors involved
in nonsynaptic (intrinsic) plasticity. There are numerous mechanisms that can be involved in
adjusting neural criterial causation, many of which have yet to be explored. Interestingly, my
own neuroscience research in the optic tectum of Xenopus tadpoles has rendered results that
unwittingly highlight the relevance of neural noise in encoding information, which supports
indeterministic prerequisite activity to be acted upon by endogenous attention, and which has
investigated the role of intrinsic plasticity in maintaining homeostatic, or sustainable, levels of
activity in the face of long term stimulation.
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Whole Brain Free Will
Tse’s discussion on the topic of free will is extensive and covers a great deal of ground.
As such, I will be presenting Klemm as more of a supplement to Tse’s model that brings us back
toward practical reasoning. In our discussion of Tse we have seen a thorough explanation for just
about every component of a complete model for free will except how executive control comes
about and what it really means at the level of deliberation, representations, and reasoning. How is
executive control over endogenous attention and working memory functions free? It is clear how
we can enforce a decision, and that these executive processes have a goal, and evolutionarily
advantage, but what makes this control indeterministic at such a large scale? How do we have
alternative possibilities from quantum uncertainty that reach all the way up to the representations
of executive deliberation. Ultimately, the question I seek to answer with Klemm is: how do
executive functions constitute a free willing self?
Klemm writes that “there is no doubt that humans exhibit willful considered behavior.
We have, many people say, free will. That is, we supposedly can decide from among several
alternatives, and this process is not directly controlled by external or internal imperatives.”
(168) From here comes the idea of a human avatar. According to Klemm, our consciousness is
essentially an avatar, like the characters in video games, which act as proxies for the gamer in
the world of the game. However, Klemm writes that “the analogy of computer avatars breaks
down when it comes to human consciousness avatars. Computer avatars cannot generate their
own agency.” (146) He notes that “brain avatars respond to impulses and instructions from
unconscious mind as well as ongoing environmental effects. Unlike computer avatars, however,
the brain’s avatar may act on its own initiative to serve the best interests of the brain and the
body” (146).
For Klemm, this avatar is nothing like a miniature person, a homunculus, inside our head
that makes free willing decisions for us. The fallacy of the age old ‘homuncularist’ argument is
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clear, if there is some model person inside us that regulates everything we do as a unified agent,
then what controls that person? A smaller homunculus? For Klemm, the avatar is spread out in
a series of representations of self that centralize internal simulations of action and thought. It is
thought that a vital characteristic of human learning is the ability to simulate action in an internal
model of the world, kind of like generating a virtual reality, in which we can place ourselves and
test out different scenarios to optimize our solution to a problem.
The basis for this avatar is what Klemm calls a “CIP representation of the body” (146),
where CIP stands for circuit impulse patterns. According to Klemm, circuit impulse patterns are
“simultaneous activity across all neurons in a circuit at a given point in time,” which is thought
to be able to “have some sort of combinatorial or collective code” (38). Essentially, CIP’s are
similar to the bursting activity Tse described wherein a collective pattern of activity is capable
of encoding more information than the mere some of its parts. As such, CIP’s are patterns of
activity that form representations, which are a complex combination of associated inputs. For
example, granny smith apples. You’d have neurons that represent the color of the apple (green),
the shape (spherical), and the size (2-3 inches in diameter). Whenever you encountered an
object with those qualities, those neurons that are sensitive to the object’s size, or shape, or color
would be active in parallel, which would give rise to the representation of the fruit as a whole.
Of course, our experience of the world is so much more rich than this, and our brain is equally
and indescribably more complex than this example leads us to believe, but the general idea,
when we understand it, remains the same. When a current impulse flows through larger patterns
of neurons, instead of just a couple neurons, or basic circuits, it is capable of encoding and
representing collective information.
It is also important to note that the CIP’s do not exist in isolation, they interact with each
other on a constant basis, recruiting additional CIP’s in order to conduct complex deliberative
processes. Back to the apple example, when we encounter this object, we may also recruit the
CIP representation of a tennis ball to compare how each fits the scenario. After deliberating, after
directing endogenous attention to particular regions of the object to try to identify a stem, or the
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braiding pattern on a tennis ball, we can come to the conclusion that this object is an apple and
that we can eat it.
Importantly, Klemm notes that CIP’s underlie all basic brain functions “including the
state of consciousness” (145). Thus, there is a “CIP state of consciousness,” which is a network
of CIPs that collectively represent the self. This CIP state is “contained within the meta-circuit of
the whole brain and is therefore integrated with what goes on in unconscious processing” (145).
Having a CIP-level representation of self provides a reference against which all other CIPs can
measure their activity. Tse gave us a background for how qualia act as a common language for
the brain to generate countless representations; Klemm discusses how CIPs, the architectural/
functional explanation of these representations, refer to a complicated, but unified representation
of self in order to be consistent and efficient.
When I speak of common languages throughout the brain, or unified representations
of self, I am discussing the cohesiveness of the brain at the cognitive level. Often, it doesn’t
feel like our brain is so clearly communicative; sometimes it feels backlogged, or stuck, or
blank. Likewise, it doesn’t feel like our concept of self is so clear either; frequently we feel as
though we aren’t sure what we like or dislike, what intentions we are driven by, or why we feel
terribly sad when we ‘should’ be happy. There are approximately 20 billion neurons located in
the cerebrum, the ‘thinking’ part of the brain, alone. There are thought to be five times as many
neurons in the primal parts of our brain (the cerebellum and brainstem), and ten times as many
glial cells as neurons; we know very little about the range of functions of glial cells, which
puts in perspective how little knowledge we really have about the brain. Not only is there such
a vast number, but they are organized with the efficiency and robustness of the primate family
such that the activity of a few neurons is capable of encoding more information than other large
brains that are less well organized, like in elephants and dolphins (Herculano-Houzel, 2009).
My point is that, as much as examples, metaphors, and simplifications can help us to understand
the underlying mechanisms at play, we have to remember and appreciate the fact that these
mechanisms are being applied rapidly, very rapidly, at the scale of milliseconds, or even fractions
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of milliseconds if we’re talking about gene transcription and protein turnover; and all of this in
huge quantity, far beyond anything we can really imagine (despite these activities enabling our
ability to imagine anything in the first place).
When we discuss cognitive processing in the brain, the fact that all of these activities
can combine into the smooth, continuous and sensical movement of my fingers to type these
words that you can understand, displays a feat of effective communication and unification that
is beyond belief. I hesitate to compare neurons to humans, as they are very different in key
respects, but just to try and grasp the sheer numbers, imagine if every human on earth were
capable of communicating and executing joint actions to move a giant, planet sized being. This
is only one third the number of neurons in the cortex, and less than a thousandth the scale of
the number of neural and glial cells that contribute to the thought and action of a single human.
It’s mind blowing. It only makes sense that neurons are communicating in a single language,
and must be very unified in order for such complexity of thought and movement to be achieved.
Thus, our brain is unified even if it doesn’t feel like it, and often times if we declutter our
thoughts and concentrate, we can overcome moments when we blank and return to a clear sense
of what we do and do not know. Similarly, when we meditate and deliberate sincerely, we can
usually uncover what our thoughts and feelings are if we ever feel confused. Doing so makes us
better and stronger people because we exercise conscious control over what our brain does, and
sculpt ourselves into people who can overcome our obstacles.
Turning back to Klemm after that moment of reflection, I want to show how he defends
his theory. Klemm is sure to note that “skeptics will say that these aspects of the avatar’s nature
are preprogrammed by past experience or by genetic disposition,” which is to say that the CIP
structure of the avatar, the anatomical structure of the neurons or the functional characteristics
those cells have, is dictated by genetics, not by any conscious sculpting of the self. In response,
he argues that “experiential influences are developed and learned and become explicitly
incorporated because they are acceptable to the avatar… [and] even much of the genetic
influence is actually epigenetic, in which a person’s choice of thought, behavior, and experiences
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helps to control which genes get expressed” (169). Epigenetic mechanisms, in a nutshell, are
modifications to our DNA that up or down regulate (increase or decrease) the expression of
specific genes. These modifications, instead of being preprogrammed by our heredity, are
accumulated, or removed, as a result of experience. Thus, our choice of what experiences to
have exposes us to stimuli that will precipitate some or other epigenetic changes to our gene
expression.
In his primary defense of free will, Klemm proposes that during the process of
deliberation our conscious avatar can freely choose which considerations to take when faced
with the problem. This process of deliberation, to Klemm, is essentially a complex network of
CIP’s that are all interacting and recruiting new CIP’s in the process of recollecting relevant
information in memory for a given problem. He proposes that “when decisions are performed by
the conscious mind, the avatar can differentially select what inputs from stimuli and memory to
consider, thus ultimately biasing one option over others. If conscious mind is an avatar, acting as
an agent with a “mind of its own,” what is to keep it from making its own choices? This might be
the basis for free will” (195). A mechanism for this action makes sense biologically, which is to
say evolutionarily, because, as Klemm points out, “the capacity for conscious action means that
humans can rise above unconsciously driven behaviors that are unwise or maladaptive” (203).
From free willing deliberation can come imagination, critical thinking, and creative problem
solving, all of which generate new solutions that are not limited by what is predetermined by our
experience, our heritage, or our prejudices.
Klemm’s theory relates directly to the concept of self-generation. He brings in the
example of crawfish who “will often move when they don’t have to… no external stimulus is
required” (173). To explain this, he writes that “there are, however, internally generated stimuli
that turn movement initiating systems on. Likely such movement results from random neural
activity in the pattern generator circuit, and the option to remain in place or move to a different
place was always there” (173). Ultimately he writes that “random things happen in nervous
systems. They are not always inevitable,” and he suggests that these internally generated stimuli
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“may be something as simple as inherent membrane instabilities in certain movement initiating
neurons that make the neurons discharge impulses” (173). Tse has explained this randomized
“instability” at a cellular level. Given that such events can happen in the nervous system we
can see that new, or modified, neural activity can be generated without the influence of events
external to the brain. New activity, even at the level of a single cell, can be amplified to influence
the activity of many more neurons downstream (London et al., 2010). Thus, small changes could
generate new CIP representations, which in their turn would introduce new representations
to the process of deliberation. If they were selected and approved by the avatar that is our
consciousness, then they would ultimately contribute to the representation of self.
***
Let’s compare this to practical reasoning and to my theory of self-generating motivation.
The CIP recruitment process is essentially the neural correlate of deliberation and reasoning.
A given set of CIP’s will represent reasons to act one way or another. During the process of
deliberation the CIP’s are tested for how well they remain consistent to the representation of
self, which is the equivalent of saying that during the process of deliberation our reasons are
tested for how well they remain consistent with our identity. As we’ve seen from the work of
Tse and Klemm, during the process of deliberation, which is the activity of executive processes
like endogenous attention and working memory, our brain can exercise new patterns of activity.
These new patterns are not predetermined by external influence or hardwired programs by virtue
of indeterminism that, at the cellular level, generates novel patterns of activity. Novelty at the
cellular level can affect the activity of the networks of which they are a part, which can generate
or influence entire CIP representations. Given new variants, or completely new CIPs, we can
consciously choose one by directing attention to it. When we generate this new activity we are
generating new reasons to act a certain way.
As such, I hold that consciousness does have a causal role in the redefining of neural
activity, and in the restructuring of network connectivity. Not only is this a position based on
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the scientific findings I’ve described, there are many philosophers who agree with Dennett on
many points, but not on the theory that consciousness is strictly an observation. In “Self to
Self: Selected Essays,” J. David Velleman, who, like Dennett, holds that the self is constituted
by a narrative, maintains that consciousness is action guiding, meaning that consciousness has
a causal role in our decisions. As he writes, “In Dennett’s view, our error about the self is to
assume that the protagonist of a human being’s autobiography is identical with the author” (206).
While he holds that the “‘central controller’ of a person may indeed be a fiction…” it is still a
conscious “reflective representation that feeds back into the person’s behavior” (214). As such,
Velleman suggests that “subjects are ‘living out’ their self-conceptions… they are doing things
that would accord with what they have described themselves as feeling” (215). This invokes the
importance of our conscious construction of identity in guiding subsequent action.
When the right constellation of reasons is found to be sufficiently optimal by our
consciousness then it genuinely moves us to act. Selecting some reason over another stabilizes
the neural pattern that generated the relevant representations. This physically sculpts our circuits,
in the sense of how responsive cells are, and in the sense of how they are physically connected
to each other. As such, future activity has an updated framework in which to act. This framework
is vital because it forces future unconscious activity to flow through patterns of cellular criteria
and anatomy that have been created and endorsed by our consciousness such that they act as an
extension of our conscious deliberations, like water flowing through an aqueduct.
As I’ve said before, new motivations may compel us to act in the same way that we
would have given a different constellation of reasons. For example, we may choose not to yell
at our friend for their sake, or we may choose not to for our sake, or for the sake of someone
else, or some other consideration. Thus, a single action may have multiple, antecedent reasons.
I believe it is important to distinguish between which reason compels any given action, between
what it is that genuinely motivates us. This motivation will be entirely novel compared to the
motivation that would have compelled an automatic decision. An automatic decision would
have undergone approval by the avatar for reasons that have been previously established during
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former deliberation. I might automatically choose not to yell at someone for my own sake, or,
after some deliberation, I may still choose not to yell at someone, and I may still make that
choice for my own sake. I hold that the automatic and the deliberative decisions are always
different. Any choice that has undergone a process of deliberation will necessarily be novel
because it will always have had to verify itself against new information. Thus, every time we
are making a conscious choice, not only are we self-generating a motivation, but this motivation
is entirely novel and is part of a larger framework of choices that make up who we are and as
whom we identify.
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Chapter 4

Implications In Daily Life

This project has always been more to me than a purely academic debate over abstract,
esoteric terms and conditions. This is not to say that the academic debate isn’t valuable, it is,
and its success relies on these careful debates over key terms and conditions. But at the heart of
this project has been a beating curiosity about daily life. I hold concepts of responsibility and
morality to be central in our day to day interactions with people and the world around us. My
inspiration to explore free will is inspired by my own questions about what is moral, about what
I must take responsibility for, and what I must be responsible for doing. This is not to say that
the academic tilt of the past three chapters is a disguise for my true interests. I believe that an
important tool for exploring these concepts is to disentangle the vines that have grown around
this tree and try to access the core of the issues. To do this, I believe we need to resort to very
basic questions about causality and freedom, which we have done. In so doing we have certainly
ripped some leaves off the branches, and while some long, tangled vines remain, we can see the
trunk more clearly, and I believe that the path ahead is less obscured. In this chapter I’d like to
take a step back from the rigor of academic analysis and briefly touch upon some implications of
my proposals that will end in casual observations about our day to day activities.

Moral Responsibility
First, how does this discussion of free will impact our morals? As I discussed very
early on in the introduction, the fundamental question of morality depends upon responsibility,
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or moral culpability. Moral philosophy explores what we should do. For the most part, and I
acknowledge that there are exceptions, the question of what we should do in a given scenario
depends on what we can be considered responsible for doing. There’s no point in holding a
position on what we should do if we cannot be considered responsible for the relevant outcome.
For example, it would be silly for a moral philosophy to hold that we should not sneeze in the
presence of a respected elder. It is silly because we cannot be held responsible for sneezing, it is
a biological function that occurs automatically and uncontrollably.
How does free will come into play here? Returning to my introduction, I noted that
questions of responsibility are essentially questions of control. If we have control over the
outcome of a situation, then we can be held responsible for said outcome. Taking one step lower,
the question of control is a question of free will, in my opinion. According to my definition,
free will is the capacity to control our cognitive mechanisms such that activity in our brains is
not a strictly automatic process. What does it mean for “us” to control our brain? It seems to me
that consciousness is the most frequent metric for when “we” have control over our brain, as it
seems wrong to blame someone for something they have done without consciously supporting
it. I therefore suggested that consciousness is the seat of the self, and in order for our self to be
considered responsible, morally culpable, for our actions, our consciousness must be capable of
influencing the way we deliberate and decide on a course of action.
What we have seen in the chapters leading up to this is a brief background of the
contemporary positions on free will, a proposal for how free will could be manifest in practical
reasoning, and several perspectives on the scientific plausibility of this proposal. I have hopefully
convinced you that the concept of conscious control over the physical substrate of our brain is
not divorced from reality. Based on what we currently know, we do not require magic, or radical
paradigm shifts to substantiate how conscious processes (the “us,” the concept of self, the feeling
of me) absolutely can exercise top down control over the lower cognitive mechanisms in our
brain, which mediate the complex calculations required to design actions that will attend to a
situation in the most optimal fashion. We have seen that the processes making up consciousness
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are capable of generating new solutions to a problem in order to find an optimal solution, and
then can change the criteria, or the rules, that lower processes in the brain follow to execute the
relevant actions.
Returning to our moral approach to the world, the way we define and substantiate free
will doesn’t seem to impact what activities we define as either moral or immoral; however,
I suggest that my model for free will can help us to determine under what circumstances an
individual’s adherence to our moral system is enough to be considered moral (or immoral), or
if it is amoral. According to most moral philosophies an action is amoral, neither moral nor
immoral, if it doesn’t enter the moral plane, which is to say, if it is accidental, uncontrollable,
or unintended. This makes intuitive sense. You may be frustrated by someone who stumbles
and drops a box on your foot, but you wouldn’t consider them immoral as it was an accident.
Likewise, you couldn’t possibly blame a driver who has a seizure for causing an accident with
another car as the situation was out of their control. Finally, you wouldn’t consider someone
immoral if, when trying to comfort you, they hurt your feelings more; they were just trying to
help. Likewise, in the opposite direction, we wouldn’t attribute good results to someone who
caused them accidentally, unintentionally (as a result of some other action), or in circumstances
that were out of control. This new model of free will provides a framework for recognizing
when an action is legitimately unintentional, or uncontrollable, and when it was under the
agent’s control. Of course, a great deal of empirical studies will need to follow up to flush out
the mechanisms, and improve our ability to detect those mechanisms in action, but this is an
important step in the philosophical approach.
Some philosophers have addressed the blameworthiness of psychopaths who are
capable of deliberation and rational thought, thereby placing their actions in the plane of moral
consideration, but who are completely blind to moral codes by no fault of their own, which
would seem to render them outside of the moral plane (Talbert, 2008; Watson, 2013). I would
suggest that further empirical studies subsequent to my model of free will could help establish if
cases of psychopathy, and other mental disorders, warrant blameworthiness.
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Some moral philosophies do not require intention, consciousness, or control for an
action to enter the moral plane. This reminds us of the relativism of morality, which lends
strength to my argument that the perception of morality, responsibility, and personal culpability
relies heavily on someone’s upbringing. Against Wegner and other illusionists, if we are raised
believing that free will is an illusion, it would impact the way we conceive of morality. In a
prime example, one study has found that belief in free will directly causes increased feelings
of gratitude, as believing in our free will and the free will of others influences how much we
consider acts to be sincerely motivated (Mackenzie et al., 2014).
It would be wrong of me not to also acknowledge the ways in which moral relativism
opposes my model for free will. According to my model, free will is found in an agent that
can be strictly understood to be an individual human. This is because I personally consider the
individual person to be the right combination of complex processes that make up a self-sufficient
and free willing body, and yet be small enough to represent the basic unit of free will. Many noneurocentric/non-Western cultures combine the concept of individual free will with the concept
of communal free will. For example, there are traditional African philosophies, such as those
of the Akan people in current day Ghana and Ivory Coast, where the community is considered
the fundamental, basic unit while individuals were considered not to be self-sufficient agents.
In contemporary African moral philosophy there is debate about whether those traditional
values provide a moral framework that can effectively resolve contemporary conflicts, or if an
individualistic moral philosophy more accurately defines where free will is bound, and therefore
how to best allocate moral responsibility (Oyowe, 2013).
Community based moral systems where the individual is not considered the basic unit
stand in odd contrast to my assumption that the individual is the seat of free will and moral
responsibility. There is something to be said for the fact that, without a community, there is
no concept of responsibility, punishment and reward, legal culpability, and even the reactive
attitudes that P.F. Strawson argues are more important in the schema of moral responsibility than
the causal background of an action (Strawson, 1962). At least, so we can expect; there aren’t
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enough cases of people living in absolute exclusion from communities who can report their
experiences. As my thesis does not seek to adjudicate on moral relativism vs objectivism, I will
leave this question to someone else.
My model of free will uses the in-depth, combined perspectives of several leading
neuroscientists (each of whose proposals stands on the shoulders of extensive scientific literature,
so it isn’t really just the position of a few neuroscientists) to provide a substantive empirical
background to my philosophical model. Moving forward I suggest that further empirical studies
can pick apart the mechanisms involved in the version of free will that is roughly outlined
here. In so doing we could establish ways to distinguish between acts that are freely willed
and those that are not. I do not suggest that my model will discover new moral codes, (i.e. we
won’t suddenly find out that, yes, we do have control over when we drop heavy objects), but
rather that we might learn to distinguish between when we have control over, intention toward,
or awareness of the outcome in a given situation, and when we don’t. This could help us to
elucidate whether an action in some grey area does warrant consideration in the moral plane.
For example, it is hard to say whether I should be blamed for being standoffish when it can be
argued that my abrasive qualities are entirely unintentional and unconscious. On the one hand,
I am not actively motivated to be standoffish, I just come off that way (in this hypothetical
world). On the other hand, had I undergone careful deliberation, maybe I could have changed my
conscious motivations in a way that impacted my future unconscious activity, thereby preventing
my appearing abrasive, even when I wasn’t thinking about it. When we know more empirically
about free will, we could better determine if I have control over my standoffishness, and should
therefore be considered in the moral plane, or not, in which case my trespasses can slip below the
radar as an accident.
Legal Repercussions
Despite clarifying some questions of blameworthiness, the problem of how to assign
punishment or reward on the basis of actual culpability is still thoroughly complex. As such, how
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does this proposal change our system of law and order? In “Incognito: The Secret Lives of the
Brain,” David Eagleman addresses the wonder of the subconscious brain as it relates to almost
every component of our lives. In particular, Eagleman raises the question of blameworthiness for
subconscious actions and its impact in our current legal system.
When confronted with the question of free will, Eagleman is quick to support an
eliminitive compatibilist position much like that of Wegner. He holds that the brain strictly
follows laws of determinism while simultaneously agreeing that such a state isn’t compatible
with free will, thereby concluding that free will, as we think of it, does not exist beyond illusion.
At one point, Eagleman acknowledges the argument about quantum indeterminacy, but he draws
the conclusion that: “a system that is probabilistic and unpredictable is every bit as unsatisfying
as a system that is deterministic, because in both cases there is no choice. It’s either coin flips
or billiard balls but neither case equates to freedom in the sense that we’d desire to have it”
(168). Eagleman devotes exactly a paragraph in his book to acknowledging indeterminism, and
concludes that indeterminism cannot provide the answer. As I have shown, when we consider the
non-probabilistic ends of indeterminism, it defies Eagleman’s terse treatment.
As we have seen, the structure of the brain as it has evolved is not only capable of
amplifying quantum level indeterminacy but also of wielding it in a way that is not probabilistic
after a point. This suggests that indeterminacy in the brain is neither, necessarily, superseded by
the larger magnitudes of structure, and nor is it strictly probabilistic, or random, and therefore
incompatible with free will. Klemm supported this view. He predicts the conclusion that
Eagleman draws: “the doctrine of determinism states that every fact in the universe is guided
entirely by physical law. Quantum mechanics also posits that nature is random until observed
or measured. Neither facet provides much room for free will in human decisions. Fatalism and
destiny governed by probabilities are corollaries” (195). However, Klemm goes on to say that
“the equations of quantum mechanics do not predict what will happen, but rather the probability
of what will happen.” This opposition to Eagleman-esque conclusions about quantum mechanics
supports my theory that while starting out as quantum uncertainty, indeterminism in the brain
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need not be entirely random. Of course, Klemm writes further that “human behavior is much
more complex and subject to numerous variables have nothing to do with quantum mechanics.
Free will is greatly removed from the activity of subatomic particles.” This would seem to detract
from a theory proposing the import of quantum mechanics, but I read this to mean that quantum
uncertainty does not govern free will, while not ruling out the fact that it is a factor.
Indeed, he does support the idea that “a more practical criterion for free will is that of
‘could have done otherwise’” (195). A ‘could have done otherwise’ clause invokes a very similar
argument to that of the libertarians who suggest that alternative possibilities provide a gamut of
choices from which a free willing agent can opt for their preferred action. Recall that Klemm
supports the idea that “when decisions are performed by the conscious mind, the avatar can
differentially select what inputs from stimuli and memory to consider, thus ultimately biasing
one option over others” (195). The concept of an avatar choosing what considerations to select
when choosing from an array of options is directly comparable to my definition of free will as the
act of self-generating a motivation wherein, during the process of deliberation, our consciousness
defines the rules for calculating the pros and cons of each choice.
Aside from the fact that we disagree on what free will is, or can be, and whether or
not it exists beyond illusion, I also find Eagleman’s address of blameworthiness and law to be
incomplete. I truly admire his work, let me be clear. Incognito is a fascinating book and I agree
with a great deal of it, almost all of it, except for the admittedly fundamental premise that free
will is an illusion. I extend this same belief and respect to Wegner. I believe that the unconscious
brain is a vast part of our lives, and I agree that, to a large extent, we are deterministic creatures.
However, I disagree that all of Eagleman’s and Wegner’s evidence means there is not a larger,
guiding capability in humans, and perhaps other animals (it’s too soon to tell), that maintains
and is responsible for a majority of our unconscious action. Discussing Eagleman’s theories of
blameworthiness and law will be an example of how I can agree with most of his conclusions,
while disagreeing with the premise and finding the conclusions to be incomplete.
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After concluding that humans are strictly determined, Eagleman takes the stance that our
thoughts, decisions, and actions are the consequence of our external influence, our biological
makeup, and any relevant pathologies. He notes that “responsibility for your actions parallels
volitional control,” which is to say that we would need to have free will and need to be able to
control what choices we make if we are to be held responsible for those actions. He notes that
free will is an open scientific question but goes on to say that “the answer to the question of free
will doesn’t matter– At least not for the purposes of social policy…” (170). Eagleman develops
a theory he calls the principle of sufficient automatism. He claims that, “taking into account
the steering power of our genetics, childhood experiences, environmental toxins, hormones,
neurotransmitters, and neural circuitry, enough of our decisions are beyond our explicit control”
which, to him, means that “free will may exist – but if it does it has very little room in which to
operate… the principal states that the answer to the free-will question simply does not matter”
(170). Reasserting Klemm’s objection that most genetic expression is epigenetic, and therefore
modified by experiences we choose, and Tse’s argument that automatic neural mechanisms
can be criterially adjusted by consciousness, much of what Eagleman claims is beyond explicit
control is actually well within the control of a free willing agent.
The question of what is possible without consciousness is an old one. A classic
formulation for calling into question the essential nature of conscious intervention in decisionmaking is the zombie argument. Imagine a creature, the zombie, with every capacity of a normal
human except conscious experience. The claim of the zombie problem is that we could imagine
such a thing, that conscious experience is a non-causal component of us that can be removed
from the equation without disturbing functionality. For Tse, the question doesn’t work. Either
humans and zombies are completely different, or they are exactly the same down to sharing
conscious experience. The two would be different because we’ve removed “‘precompiled’
information that endogenous attentional and planning circuitry can access and operate on,”
which makes it so that the zombies would have “nothing to manipulate in working memory for
purposes of planning or internal visualization” (10.83). It could be argued that zombies ‘could’

95
be built with the ability to direct attention, but that the attention would not be manipulating
consciously experienced qualia. Tse objects that this is impossible, the point of endogenous
attention is that it manipulates consciously experienced qualia. There is no “endogenously
‘inaccessible qualia’” (10.83) that can be removed to make this hypothetical zombie. Thus, we
cannot debunk the importance of consciousness in decision making using the zombie problem
because its presuppositions are incoherent. There is evidence for the fact that endogenous
attention is required to perform some tasks in the efficient way that we free willing agents do
(Lee, 1999; Carrasco, 2004; Lu, 2004; Chong, 2005; and Busse, 2008, to name only a few
examples).
Back to Eagleman, he asserts that assigning blame and our legal system is currently
based on what biological factors we are capable of detecting with our technology. The natural
conclusion would be, as Eagleman acknowledges, that, “the bottom line of the argument is
that a criminal should always be treated as incapable of having acted otherwise. The criminal
activity itself should be taken as evidence of brain abnormality, regardless of whether currently
measurable problems can be pinpointed” (177). As such, Eagleman argues that blame for a crime
or legal culpability, “appears to be the wrong question to ask. Here’s the right question: what
do we do, moving forward, with an accused criminal?” While I disagree with the premise that
blameworthiness, moral responsibility, or legal culpability, is irrelevant because we do not have
free will, I agree with the conclusion that the criminal justice system should focus more on what
to do with criminals moving forward rather than to throwing them in jail without first trying to
help them. As he writes, “a forward thinking legal system will parlay biological understanding
into customized rehabilitation…” (180). Agreeing with Eagleman on this point is easy enough.
Of course, I believe in mercy, compassion, understanding, and rehabilitation as opposed to the
indubitably unfair and cruel criminal justice system in place. I also agree with what he proposes
we can do to address this question of what to do moving forward.
Eagleman proposes that “to help a citizen reintegrate into society, the ethical goal is to
change him as little as possible to allow his behavior to come into line with society’s needs”
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(182). The goal is to change the criminal as little as possible in order to avoid the frightening
conclusion of science fiction novels such as Clockwork Orange, and 1984. He goes on to say
that this can be done by focusing on impulse control. As he writes, “poor impulse control is
a hallmark characteristic of the majority of criminals in the prison system” (182). Thus he
concludes that the best rehabilitative strategy for criminals is “to give the frontal lobes [involved
in long term planning] practice in squelching the short-term [impulse driven] circuits” (183).
Our impulses, like the desire for chocolate, money, snacks, alcohol, television, or sex, are kept
at bay by our frontal lobes, which suppress this short term activity when keeping in mind larger
concepts like social acceptability, discipline, and future plans. Most of us have a temptation that
overwhelms the frontal lobes ability to suppress it, but normally acting on these temptations does
not invoke legal ramifications. For those of us with especially poor impulse control, Eagleman
suggests that these can make for criminal activity and can be corrected through customized
impulse control activities, which he describes in more detail in his book. The long and short of
it is that I agree with his proposals as a system for rehabilitation, and as an alternative to the
counterproductive criminal justice system we currently have in place.
The mistake, or the missing piece to a complete solution, is the lack of attention to
the concept of responsibility. At the level of the application of law, personal concepts of
responsibility are irrelevant. The law will determine culpability according to its predefined
principles. However, moral decision making comes into play in situations that are not resolved
by “blind” justice. One example is that of rehabilitation. The goal is to bring the person to a place
where they can better understand what their responsibilities to society are, and how they can
exercise more control over their actions in order to fulfill their duties. In this case, I believe that
it would be unhealthy, and counterproductive, in addition to inaccurate, to instill the belief that
conscious control is an illusion and that our actions are ultimately uncontrollable by anything but
the automatic, hardwired components of our brain.
Rehabilitation need not only be a cure for criminal behavior, in “The Brain That
Changes Itself,” psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Norman Doidge discusses cases of patients
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with mental disorders and damage from trauma who have been successfully cured by a variety
of techniques aimed at ‘rewiring’ the brain. As he writes extensively, it is becoming clear in
contemporary neuroscience that the analogy of the brain as machine has the fundamental flaw
of underestimating neuroplasticity, the inherent malleability of neural connections in our brain.
Of particular relation to the topic of free will and consciousness, he even demonstrates how
imagination and mental practice can optimize the connectivity in our brain in order to perform
specific tasks. In essence, he is describing the ability of our conscious mental mechanisms,
such as Klemm’s CIPs or Tse’s endogenous attention and working memory, to sculpt neural
pathways. These changes to the brain would not only influence those actions mandated by our
consciousness, they would also influence the unconscious processing of information, which
would be forced to proceed through the sculpted framework.
Personal Identity
Other examples can be found in daily life. This brings me to my final comments on
free will. Given current neuroscience, I believe that we need not rely on Wegner’s concept of
morality and responsibility, but can instead turn to the theories of practical philosophers such
as Korsgaard. Recall from Chapter 1 that, to Wegner, the strength of our illusion is enough to
maintain the phenomenology of free will, which in turn maintains moralistic behavior.
As I have said when previously discussing Wegner, beyond my contention that free will
isn’t an illusion, I hold that the intentional stance would not be infallible to the belief that free
will is an illusion. As such, there’s no point in drawing such an influential conclusion when the
evidence doesn’t exist. Wegner makes a strong case for the role of unconscious action through
his use of examples from pathologies. I willingly concede that consciousness is not necessary
for action. However, the arguments I have presented on the causal role of consciousness do
not require that decision-making and action be contingent on conscious intervention. What
Ramachandran, Tse, and Klemm suggest is that consciousness optimizes the process of decisionmaking in order to drive action that is consistent to a single self-identity. Upholding a concept

98
of self-identity through conscious influence on decision-making has ultimately led to the
optimization of interspecies interactions, which have enabled the construction of cooperative
efforts, societies, and, at this point, the miraculously interconnected global community.
The fault in Wegner’s argument is in understating what he calls phenomenal free will.
Instead, Wegner pushes to the fore the strength of the role of unconscious decision-making.
Ultimately, it has been shown that phenomenological qualities of consciousness can sculpt
the way our automatic cognitive mechanisms function in a way that essentially makes our
unconscious decisions an extension of our conscious decisions. Wegner concedes that an
ontological free will exists wherein higher level conscious mechanisms influence those lower
down, but he maintains that phenomenology cannot have a causal role based on Libet’s studies
finding that the experience of will comes after the brain decides on an action.
I have shown that contemporary neuroscience since Wegner supports the role of
phenomenology in free will. Phenomenology provides the context for the concept of self. Our
phenomenological selves experience qualia that are precompiled by our brain, as Tse suggests,
and can consciously direct attention to some or other qualia. Directing attention ultimately
shapes which qualia are processed with greater priority. This cognitive explanation parallels the
practical reasoning explanation wherein reason is a process of deliberation to select the optimal
considerations, or motivations, to hold during decision-making.
To Wegner’s credit, I find that his reference to the import of authorship is entirely
accurate, and distinctly similar to the way that philosophers of practical reasoning describe
morality and reason. Through a lens of practical reasoning we can, lastly, look into how
this thesis on free will can impact our day to day activities. Practical reasoning provides an
explanation of how the deliberative quality of free will enables the sensation of authorship, and
how that motivates moral action. Practical reasoning operates under the assumption that the
human capacity of reason constitutes free will, which, given the contents of previous chapters,
need no longer be an assumption or an illusion. Reason, which is defined in practical reasoning
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as the capacity to reflect and deliberate, is essentially the process of our endogenous attention
manipulating lower cognitive functions, favoring some patterns of neuronal activity over others,
in order to change the criteria or rules for future neuronal activity.
Recall Korsgaard’s key quote on practical reasoning and moral decision making: “the
reflective structure of human consciousness requires that you identify yourself with some law
or principle, which will govern your choices. It requires you to be a law to yourself. And that is
the source of normativity” (103-104). This suggests that the way we identify ourselves is vitally
important in our day to day activities, which is why I turn back to this in my final notes on the
impact of free will. It is important that we uphold an identity that respects personal culpability
instead of taking the easy way out and blaming nature and hardwiring. As science enables
us to explain behavior in greater and greater detail, there can be a tendency to translate those
results into excuses for our own behavior. For example, we sometimes excuse stubbornness or
a tendency to yell when we’re upset on the way we were raised, stress, too much coffee, or too
little coffee. Sometimes we disregard some unconscious social error like invading someone’s
personal space, or repeatedly saying something demeaning by appealing to obliviousness.
Of course, there are times when appealing to a lack of control is perfectly legitimate.
Something as profound as childhood abuse, for example, can have very powerful lasting effects
that are out of the control of the agent. When I say that we need to maintain an identity that
appreciates our personal culpability, I am not suggesting that we all have to assume a radically
individualistic nature where we consider ourselves responsible for every minuscule action we
perform. Ultimately, I want to caution us against over-exaggerating those circumstances we do
not have control over. Blaming standoffish behavior on stress or upbringing is a cop out, and
it undermines what truth there might be in such a statement for someone exposed to constant
domestic abuse, who might have a far more compelling reason to be blameless for such behavior.
A final contribution from practical reasoning are the concepts of natural goodness and
deep happiness (Foot, 2001). The natural good for humans is based on the fact that we are
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reflective, rational beings in the same way that Korsgaard described. We are naturally compelled
to do as best fits our natural goodness, which means doing what we feel is best for us. This is
not to say that all action is motivated toward furthering the self, but rather the general human
good, which Foot argues is what we are all compelled toward in order to achieve deep happiness.
Deep happiness goes beyond the superficial happiness we might obtain from selfish actions; it is
experienced by one who can “not only see his or her good as bound up with goodness of desire
and action, but also feel that it is, with sentiments such as pleasure, pride and honor” (98). Our
reflective capacity discourages immoral behavior by denying us access to this deep happiness,
which is experienced about objects “that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and
work, and friendship” which can all yield a “shared reaction among human beings to things that
are very general in human life” (88). Anyone motivated toward selfish ends will be plagued by
self-inflicted guilt and the inability to trust others, which prevents any feeling of deep happiness.
As rational agents, we apply practical reasoning and are motivated to act by reasons that we
can weigh as more or less important to us. Since we are capable of seeing grounds to perform a
variety of actions, we choose one based on what I call our self-generated motivations. Our choice
of motivation is what is subject to moral scrutiny.
Knowing the power that conscious will can have over molding plastic activities in the
brain empowers us to improve ourselves. Through careful deliberation we can sculpt our moral
engagement with other people and the world at large. By consciously acknowledging the needs
and desires of others in conjunction with ourselves, and by identifying human goodness through
deliberation, we can self-generate motivation to pursue that goodness. For the most part we do
not skirt responsibility for our actions. Many people will excuse themselves in front of others and
suffer guilt alone. I do not find the experience of culpability to be in immediate danger. However,
I do believe that commitment to an identity that promotes human goodness through careful
deliberation, and the recognition of our power over our actions will make us better co-workers,
friends, lovers, and participants in the global human good.

101

Bibliography
Banks, G.; Short, P.; Martinez, J.; Latchaw, R.; Ratcliff, G.; Boller, F. “Alien Hand Syndrome:
Clinical and Postmortem Findings.” Archives of Neurology, 46.4 (1989): 456-459.
Bayne, T. “The Phenomenology of Agency.” Philosophy Compass, 3.1 (2008): 182-202.
Busse, Laura, Steffen Katzner, and Stefan Treue. “Temporal Dynamics of Neuronal Modulation
during Exogenous and Endogenous Shifts of Visual Attention in Macaque Area MT.”
PNAS 105.42 (2008): 16380–16385.
Carrasco, Marisa, Sam Ling, and Sarah Read. “Attention Alters Appearance.” Nature Neuroscience
7.3 (2004): 1–15.
Clark, A. “Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science.” Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2001).
Chong, Sang, Duje Tadin, and Randolph Blake. “Endogenous Attention Prolongs Dominance
Durations in Binocular Rivalry.” Journal of Vision 5 (2005): 1004–1012.
Dennett, D. “Consciousness Explained.” Boston, Back Bay Books (1992).
Doidge, N. “The Brain That Changes Itself.” New York: Penguin Books (2007).
Eagleman, D. “Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain.” New York: Vintage Books (2011).
Foot, P. “Natural Goodness.” Oxford: Clarendon Press (2003).
Frankfurt, H. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person.” The Journal of Philosophy,
68.1 (1978): 5-20.
Haggard, P. “Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will.” Nature Reviews, 9 (2008): 934946.
Kane, R. “Torn decisions, luck, and libertarian free will: comments on Balaguer’s free will as an

102
open scientific problem.” Philosophical Studies,169 (2014): 51-58.
Kant, I. Trans. and Eds. Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals.” Cambridge, Cambridge University Text.
Klemm, W. R. “Mental Biology: The New Science of How the Brain and Mind Relate.” Amherst:
Prometheus Books (2014).
Korsgaard, K. “Sources of Normativity.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996).
Lee, D. “Effects of Exogenous and Endogenous Attention on Visually Guided Hand Movements.”
Cognitive Brain Research 8 (1999): 143–156.
Libet, B. “Do we have free will?” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6.8 (1999): 47-57.
Lu, Zhong-lin, Seong-taek Jeon, and Barbara Anne Dosher. “Temporal Tuning Characteristics of
the Perceptual Template and Endogenous Cuing of Spatial Attention Q.” Vision Research
44 (2004): 1333–1350.
Mele, A. “Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will.” Oxford: Oxford University Press
(2009).
Mele, A. “Free Will and Neuroscience.” Philosophic Exchange, 43.1 (2013): 1-17.
Oyowe, O. “Individual and Community in Contemporary African Moral-Political Philosophy.”
Philosophia Africana, 15.2 (2013): 117-136.
Perlovsky, L. “Free Will and Advances in Cognitive Science.” Open Journal of Philosophy, 2.1
(2012): 32-37.
Ramachandran, V.S. “A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness.” New York: Pi Press (2004).
Slingerland, E. “Trying Not To Try: Ancient China, Modern Science, and the Power of Spontaneity.”
New York: Broadway Books (2014).
Smilansky, S. “Free Will and Illusion.” Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000).
Smilansky, S. “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism and the Centrality of Illusion.” Oxford Handbook

103
of Free Will. Ed. Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002), p. 489-505.
Strawson, P. F. “Freedom and Resentment.” British Academy. N.p., 1962. 1–15.
Strawson, G. “Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 13.10 (2006): 3-31.
Talbert, M. “Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy?”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89 (2008): 516-535.
Tse, P. U. “The Neural Basis of Free Will.” Cambridge: MIT Press (2013).
Velleman, J. “Self to Self: Selected Essays.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005).
Watson, G. “Free Agency.” The Journal of Philosophy, 72.8 (1975): 205-220.
Watson, G. “Psychopathy Agency and Prudential Deficits.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
113.3 (2013): 269-292.
Wegner, D. “The Illusion of Conscious Will.” Cambridge, The MIT Press (2002).
Wegner, D. “Precis of The Illusion of Conscious Will.” Behavioral and Brain Studies, 27 (2004):
1-45.
Widerker, D., McKenna, M. “Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the
Importance of Alternative Possibilities.” Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Company (2006).

